Instead of having clear strategy and coordinated institutional approach, Bosnia and Herzegovina relies on partial mechanisms, international projects and ad hoc reactions, while most of the real work is done by civil society and fact-checking community.
Foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), as well as domestic disinformation, have been shaping the political dynamics, media space, and social processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina for years. Although it is a phenomenon that directly affects security, democratic processes, and trust in institutions, the government response continues to be underdeveloped, uneven, and often reactive.
Instead of having clear strategy and coordinated institutional approach, Bosnia and Herzegovina relies on partial mechanisms, international projects and ad hoc reactions, while most of the real work is done by civil society and fact-checking community.
There is no single national strategy for combating disinformation and FIMI in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are problem in various sectors – from security and elections, to media and education – but without a central body to coordinate the response. The Ministry of Security occasionally speaks about hybrid threats and foreign influence, but there is no publicly available, systematic mechanism for monitoring and analyzing FIMI campaigns.
This question was also one of the topics at the meeting of the Working Group for Bosnia and Herzegovina held in early June in Brussels as part of the “Enlargement Days” event, where representatives of European institutions, local communities, civil society and the media discussed the European path of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reforms and the fight against disinformation.
Martyna Bildziukiewicz from the European External Action Service (EEAS) pointed out that the problem of foreign information manipulation and interference is a serious challenge for countries aspiring for EU membership.
“The accession process of Bosnia and Herzegovina is taking place in a complex environment that includes disinformation and manipulative information that cross borders and deepen divisions,” she said.
She stated that the information space is particularly open to narratives from Russia and China, including claims that the European Union is allegedly inciting revolutions.
“Manipulation techniques evolve almost daily. Today we have cloned websites, content generated by artificial intelligence and various forms of FIMI activity,” Bildziukiewicz warned. She emphasized that local authorities, journalists and civil society organizations are crucial in strengthening the resilience of communities because they know the problems of citizens and ways of communicating with them best.
Coordinator of the program for combating disinformation and editor of the Raskrinkavanje platform Emir Zulejhić said that there are no Russian media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that Russian narratives are spreading nevertheless. He recalled that in February 2022, after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a documentary about Vladimir Putin was broadcast on public service.
Speaking about foreign influence, Zulejhić emphasized that the role of neighboring countries cannot be ignored either.
“When we talk about foreign interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we must also mention the influence of Serbia and Croatia. Their media are constantly present in our information space because of the common language. The topics are local politics, geopolitics, historical revisionism, denial of war crimes, polarization and the spread of hatred,” he said.
He added that most anti-EU narratives come indirectly from Russia, but are often spread by local and regional actors.
Source: envato.com
Combating information manipulation
The Ministry of Communications and Transport participates in projects to align with European standards, but has no operational role in combating disinformation. The Central Election Commission (CEC) only reacts in the context of the electoral process, while the Ombudsmen and the judiciary only act when there are cases of hate speech or human rights violations.
An entity that is the closes to proper regulatory response is the Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA), but its mandate is limited to electronic media and operators. CRA has no authority over social networks, unregistered portals and the wider digital ecosystem, which makes it ill-equipped to deal with modern forms of information manipulation. Although models for co-regulation of harmful content are being developed in cooperation with the Council of Europe, including the “Towards Co-regulation of Harmful Online Content in Bosnia and Herzegovina” study, the focus remains primarily on hate speech, child protection and professional standards, and less on FIMI as a specific category.
Self-regulatory bodies, such as the Press and Online Media Council, treat disinformation through the lens of professional ethics, not security threats. Their work is based on the Press and Online Media Code, public complaints and publication of corrections, but without the possibility of sanctions. In practice, this means that a large number of portals that spread disinformation do not fall under their jurisdiction.
In the absence of a domestic strategy, international organizations are becoming key drivers of institutional change. The EU and Council of Europe PRO-FREX program aims to strengthen freedom of expression, protect journalists, and improve regulatory mechanisms. The program produces documents that serve as a “roadmap” for domestic institutions, including recommendations for co-regulation of online content and alignment with the European Digital Services Act.
In parallel, the “Combating Disinformation in the Western Balkans (CDWB)” project focuses specifically on FIMI, analyzing narratives, sources, and patterns of manipulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region. These projects often fill gaps that domestic institutions do not address, but also show how dependent Bosnia and Herzegovina is on external initiatives.
No clear strategy
Although FIMI and disinformation are sometimes recognized in crisis situations – during a pandemic, elections or geopolitical turmoil – institutional responses generally come late and without a clear narrative strategy. Press releases and press conferences remain the dominant communication tools, but they rarely offer context, analysis or exposure of the sources of manipulation. Institutional digital communication is uneven, often protocol-based and without specialized teams to deal with crisis communication or rapid denials.
In practice, most of the work on identifying and exposing disinformation is done by fact-checking portals and civil society. Portals such as Raskrinkavanje and Istinomjera have developed methodologies for narrative analysis, fact-checking and monitoring the media ecosystem. Media organizations such as BH novinar and Mediacentar conduct research, education and campaigns on media literacy, often in collaboration with international partners. While these actors have a key role, their work cannot replace an institutional response, especially when it comes to FIMI, which requires security, diplomatic and regulatory capacities.
The general attitude of institutions towards FIMI and disinformation can be described as a combination of fragmentation, political instrumentalization and lack of strategic vision. Disinformation is often used as a political weapon, which further complicates the establishment of a non-partisan institutional response. At the same time, there is a real risk that the fight against disinformation will be misused to pressure the media and critical voices, especially in the context of the re-criminalization of defamation in the Republic of Srpska entity and the increasing frequency of SLAPP lawsuits.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is thus caught between two pressures: on the one hand, European standards require a balance between protection from harmful content and preserving freedom of expression; on the other, the domestic political context makes it difficult to build trust in the institutions that should lead this process.
Until a clear strategy, coordination and political will are established, the response to FIMI and disinformation will remain largely in the hands of civil society, international partners and individual professionals, rather than the institutions that should be the ones to carry out this work.
