On September 28, Moldova will choose not only a parliament, but also its destiny. Will it remain on the European path with Sandu, or turn toward Moscow with Dodon?
On September 28 this year, the citizens of the Republic of Moldova must decide in which direction they want to see their country in the next four years. As never before, the Moldovan parliamentary elections will be uncertain, and the political situation already looks at the very least crisis-ridden and unstable.
It is almost impossible to predict which political formation will form a majority, and social polarization is becoming more visible as election day approaches. The political spectrum itself is quite fragmented, so it is unclear whether the country will remain on the pro-European course led by the pro-Western PAS party and President Sandu, or whether it will turn to the Russian Federation if the mandate is given to the main opposition party – the Bloc of Socialists and Communists led by former Moldovan President Dodon.
Parties and individuals advocating European integration
The current president of the country, Maia Sandu, is the main politician promoting the idea that Moldova should become a full member of the EU and firmly continue its belonging to the Western world. The ruling party, PAS, which currently holds a majority in Parliament, directly cooperates with President Sandu and they practically present themselves together to the Moldovan citizens as a pro-European bloc. PAS is the party which, according to all public research and surveys, will win the largest number of parliamentary mandates in the future parliament, but it is very likely that they will not be able to form a government on their own and will be forced to look for a coalition partner.
The mayor of the capital city, Chișinău, Ceban, and his bloc “Alternative,” also proclaim themselves as a pro-Western and pro-European coalition. Unlike PAS, which has around 34–35% in surveys and is convincingly in first place, they hold 7–8% and are ranked third. According to Sandu and PAS, Ceban falsely declares himself a pro-European politician in public, while secretly working for the pro-Russian forces in the country, all with the aim of taking votes from the “pie” of the ruling party.
In the same spectrum of pro-Western parties is Moldova Mare, which was recently taken over by former prosecutor Victoria Furtuna. What is interesting about her is that before assuming the position of president of Moldova Mare, she had very hard and anti-European positions, as well as sharp criticisms of PAS and Maia Sandu, only to suddenly soften her rhetoric and become pro-European. PAS, just as with Ceban, claims this is a Russian strategy to take pro-European votes away from them, channeling them to other parties controlled from abroad.
Andrei Năstase, a former close associate of Sandu from the time they were in opposition, will now run as an independent candidate for parliament, given the conflict between them that has been present for years.
Parties and individuals advocating close relations with the Russian Federation
Former President of the Republic of Moldova, Igor Dodon, who openly cooperates with the Russian Federation and opposes Moldova’s membership in the European Union, leads the Bloc of Socialists and Communists, or newly the “Patriotic Bloc,” and is also the main opposition force opposing PAS in these elections. The PB in all public surveys weighs almost equally with the ruling party.
The political group “Pobeda” of billionaire Ilan Shor is banned from participating in these elections, although they, like Dodon’s group, firmly hold pro-Russian positions. According to information made public by Moldovan institutions, he actively worked for Victoria Furtuna in the 2024 presidential elections where she won less than 5%, and he is expected to do the same now. Furtuna is also under EU sanctions.
Former politician and oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc, who was recently detained, is also trying from behind the scenes to reactivate his PDMM, which is on the verge of disappearing and no longer appears in recent surveys, but could gain a certain (small) percentage of votes.
Our Party of Renato Usatîi can also be mentioned as part of the anti-Western parties in Moldova. He was the mayor of the small town of Bălți and always hovers between 1–2% in surveys.
Given the complex constellation of relations, where PAS is the largest party but unlikely to secure a majority on its own, the Bloc of Socialists and Communists is second, and Alternative is third, the outcome of the elections will directly show whether Moldova’s future will continue in the Western sphere of interest or turn toward the Eastern/Russian sphere of interest. There is also a danger that the country will be left without a functional government, which certainly suits those forces that do not want Moldova to move quickly toward the EU. Considering how strong the polarization is between Sandu and Dodon, there is a possibility that Ceban will be the deciding factor in (not) forming a government.
Source: freepik.com
Influences from Moscow
Last year, a referendum was held in Moldova on whether citizens wanted to become part of the EU or not. The referendum was a political tool both for PAS and Maia Sandu, to consolidate themselves as a pro-European force in the country and to show that the majority stands behind them and the European agenda, but also for Dodon’s Bloc of Socialists and Communists, which tried to show that support for the EU had significantly decreased, given that the votes FOR and AGAINST in the referendum itself were practically 50–50% until the vote of the diaspora decided in favor of PAS.
According to the Moldovan Security and Intelligence Service, during the referendum, the Russian Federation was actively involved in undermining pro-European forces, i.e., working to ensure the referendum failed and that the majority voted against. According to them, the main person through whom these destabilizing activities were carried out was Ilan Shor, a former pro-Russian politician from Moldova whose party is banned from participating in elections and who is currently in exile in Moscow.
According to reports from Moldovan services, it was a matter of different types of operations, such as spreading fake news and disinformation, financial support to parties close to the Russian Federation, organizing violent protests to create chaos and panic among the population, misuse of the Orthodox Church, as well as cyber-attacks on the country’s electoral infrastructure. PAS and President Sandu directly connect these activities to Ilan Shor, whom they consider the main organizer. Reports from the Moldovan police state that over 330 people were trained and paid to maximize the effect of these activities and that about 130,000 citizens were subject to bribery.
What should be known about Shor is that he is one of the wealthiest citizens of Moldova and that in 2023 he was sentenced to 15 years in prison for stealing about 1 billion dollars from three Moldovan banks (Banca de Economii, Unibank, and Banca Sociala). However, he never began serving the sentence, because just before the verdict was announced he first fled to Israel, and later to the Russian Federation. After receiving political asylum in Moscow, Shor founded the NGO “Eurasia.”
According to its website, Eurasia advocates for closer cooperation among states in the ex-Soviet space and claims to organize various cultural and humanitarian activities. However, according to Moldovan institutions, these seemingly noble activities are just a front behind which Shor’s organization hides, whose primary interest is promoting pro-Russian policies in Moldova by recruiting young Moldovans for training in Russia, targeting individuals prone to violence to organize unrest across the country, as well as illegally financing pro-Russian politicians and entities on Moldovan territory.
Reactions of PAS and Sandu
President of Moldova Maia Sandu continuously speaks about Russian influence in the country and the danger that if pro-Russian forces win a majority in parliament, the state will lose its sovereignty, integrity, and independence, and that European integration and the country’s future will be put in serious jeopardy. According to her, the Russian Federation has invested over 100 million euros in recent times for propaganda, organizing violent protests, and destabilization of Moldova. She also emphasizes that if pro-European forces lose the majority, Moldova could become a platform for infiltration into the Odessa region, and that Transnistria would become a completely destabilized region.
In the past few weeks, more than 70 people have been detained by Moldovan police on suspicion of participating in activities against the country’s national security, supported by a third country (the Russian Federation).
Transnistria – A constant political hotspot
Transnistria is a region located along the entire eastern border of Moldova, i.e., along the border with Ukraine. Although it is an integral part of the Republic of Moldova, the region operates independently and is indirectly controlled by Moscow. About 300,000 citizens live there, who are a direct target as potential voters for parties with pro-Russian positions.
The PAS government and President Maia Sandu, in response to what they consider aggressive Russian policy, reduced the number of polling stations in the region from 42 in 2021, to 30 in 2024, and then to only 12 polling stations for the 2025 elections. Critics argue this represents a systematic deprivation of voting rights of the population that traditionally votes for left-wing (mostly pro-Russian) or opposition parties.
Meanwhile, Moldovan authorities justify the reduction of polling stations by pointing to potential security risks related to the war in neighboring Ukraine and the difficulties of organizing free elections in territory not under state control. They claim that security guarantees must take priority, but opposition parties reject this and accuse Sandu and the ruling PAS of manipulating the electoral process and directly interfering in it to harm the opposition.
What can be expected?
In the coming months, the political struggle in Moldova is expected to intensify further. State institutions will have to demonstrate maturity and capacity to protect democratic capacity.
In such a tense and polarized atmosphere, the outcome of the elections in Moldova will be more than just an ordinary change of government, it will represent a referendum on the future of the state. Whether the European path prevails, or the country returns to Moscow’s orbit, depends on how much citizens mobilize and participate in the electoral process.
What is certain is that any decision will have deep consequences for Moldova’s stability, economy, and international position, which still stands at a crossroads between East and West.
