While Turkey may not have the same nefarious intentions as Iran and Russia when it comes to foreign influence and misinformation, many are still cautious. They see the promotion of Islam in Albania by Ankara as ‘un-Albanian’, and an infringement of its sovereignty.
While the Ottoman Turkish rule of Albania ended on November 28, 1912, the influence of nearly 530 years of occupation can still be felt today. The Albanian language, an ancient and unique branch of the Indo-European language tree, is nonetheless peppered with loanwords from Turkish, and Islam, brought to the region by the Ottomans, is still practiced, albeit loosely, by around 40% of the population.
But in 2025, there are other signs of Turkish influence in Albanian society, and not all of it is welcomed or considered positive.
Erdogan’s “neo-Ottomanism”
As you drive through the centre of Tirana, a colourful mishmash of communist-era apartment blocks and glittering high-rises, another sight dominates the skyline: the Namazgah Mosque, the largest mosque in the Balkans.
For many years, Albanian muslims had no central mosque in which to pray, with the Ottoman-era Et’hem Bey Mosque having room for just 60 worshipers. Enter the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) of Turkey, which put up EUR 30 million for the new mosque. It opened its doors in 2024, and the sprawling site, covering 10,000 sqm and accommodating 10,000 worshippers, was inaugurated by President Erdogan himself.
But not everyone was happy. The project faced controversy from its inception, with many calling it an example of Erdogan’s “neo-Ottomanism”, something particularly undesirable considering Albania’s occupation and hard-fought-for freedom from Ottoman rule. Critics also argued that the mosque is a symbol of Turkish power and influence in the Balkans, pointing to its size, design and prominent location next to the Albanian parliament and in the centre of the city. Some of those who spoke out about the mosque, or even just called it “controversial”, were attacked publicly online, including by hardline and Imam Ahmed Kalaja, who is banned from entering North Macedonia.
There was also controversy as leaders of the Muslim Community of Albania (KMSH) were absent from the inauguration ceremony. Former head of the KMSH, Skender Brucaj, called it an “ugly act”, “a shame of the protocol of the Albanian state,” and said the event was a “political rally organized by Erdogan’s party.”
“It is unfortunate that a religious symbolism, such as the inauguration of the mosque, is used for the political agenda of a foreign state”, said Bruçaj.
As for why they were banned, it is because Erdogan considers the leaders of KMSH to be part of the Gülen Movement, which was founded and directed by cleric Fethullah Gülen, once close to the Turkish president but now a sworn enemy.
The Gülen movement has long had a presence in Albania, operating kindergartens, schools and universities as well as a handful of other institutions. But following the failed coup d’état in Turkey on July 15 and 16, 2016, Erdogan launched a purge campaign, cracking down on anyone and anything considered to be part of the Gülen Movement. This crackdown also extended outside of Turkey’s borders.
A few months after the coup attempt, the Turkish government demanded that all Gülen institutions in Albania be closed. By November, the Ministry of Education and Sports issued a directive prohibiting the use of Turkish national symbols at the 13 educational institutions linked to Gülen.
Source: pexels.com
In 2017, Turkish ambassador Hidayet Bayraktar told Albanian parents to keep their children away from Gülen schools and said they should be closed.
In 2020, police raided several campuses of the Tugurt Ozal school in Tirana and Durres, claiming they were illegal. The institutions denied any links to the Gülen movement. In the same year, then-Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said Gulenists- followers of Gulen- are “not only a threat to Turkey but to countries where they are located,” adding that they must be returned to Turkey, reminding the government that they “expect the support and contribution of Albania” in education and other matters.
The same year, two Turkish citizens who tried to seek political asylum in Albania were deported without due process. The Albanian Ombudsman said the government had violated all possible laws. The United Nations said that Albania is complicit in Extraterritorial Abductions and forced disappearances of Turkish nationals.
In January 2022, Erdogan addressed the Albanian parliament, stating, “A precondition to our support and brotherhood is your commitment to the fight against FETÖ.” Later that year, two schools in the Tugurt Ozal network were closed.
Albania bending to the whim of Turkey?
Many were concerned that Albania was bending to the whim of Erdogan, and even the European Commission noted in 2025 the continued “pressure” on Albania to dismantle the Gülen network.
But why is Albania so willing to bend to pressure? It is likely due to Turkey being one of Albania’s leading foreign investors.
In the first quarter of 2025 alone, Turkey invested some EUR 49 million in the country, mainly into real estate. In October 2025, Finance Minister Delina Ibrahimaj said that Turkey had invested over EUR 1.3 billion in Albania and that 658 Turkish companies were operating in the country, particularly in construction, energy, manufacturing, and banking.
These companies, she added, make a significant contribution to Albania’s Gross Domestic Product, technological development, and job creation. Meanwhile, bilateral trade reached over EUR 620 million a year.
There is also a line of thought that Albania feels a particular debt or duty to Turkey, given Turkey’s significant humanitarian support. When a 6.4 magnitude earthquake struck central Albania on 26 November 2019, killing 51 people, injuring over 3000, and making 5000 homeless, Turkey was the first state to send help.
Within hours, search-and-rescue teams, food packages, blankets, and other essential supplies were on their way. Asides from immediate on-the-ground support, Turkey built some 504 housing units, reconstructed mosques, and gave over EUR 46 million at a donor conference.
Then, when the COVID-19 pandemic hit in 2021, Turkey came to the rescue again, sending medical aid, ambulances, medical equipment, and building a 130-bed hospital in Fier. There was no doubt the public, and the state was grateful, but most were aware it came with a cost- toeing the line when it comes to Gülen and maintaining strong, no questions asked, relations.
According to NDI, Turkey uses humanitarian investments, particularly during the pandemic and earthquake, to actively maintain influence over Muslim populations. It also feeds into narratives that promote Turkey’s “power status and aspiration to be a global leader of Islamic countries (thus indirectly feeding anti-Western narratives), as well as Erdogan’s efforts to build strong personal ties with regional leaders.”
But Turkey has also raised eyebrows over the expansion of its media presence in the country, much of which has been utilized to spread propaganda. According to the local think tank SciDev Center, several Albanian online media outlets have shown growing alignment with Turkish interests in recent years.
While the platforms are not necessarily widely read, they frequently publish what SciDev describes as “pro-Turkish propaganda,” framing the country as a regional ally while slamming political opponents, including Gülen and affiliated groups.
Additionally, a 2024 cooperation between Albanian and Turkish public broadcasters has sown the possibility of further amplification of Turkey’s messaging in Albania, raising questions about the influence of foreign narratives on Albania’s media landscape and its political and cultural institutions. Critics noted the deal was not transparent and questioned the benefits for the Albanian public. Others said the result could be an uptick in Turkish propaganda, particularly Turkish state narratives. Turkey also operates two Albanian-language media sites, Andolu Ajansı and TRT Shqip.
While Turkey may not have the same nefarious intentions as Iran and Russia when it comes to foreign influence and misinformation, many are still cautious. They see the promotion of Islam in Albania by Ankara as ‘un-Albanian’, and an infringement of its sovereignty. They also point to issues within Turkey, such as authoritarianism, media freedom infringements, backsliding democracy, and multiple human rights issues, and fear that it could be exported into Albanian society and government.
And of course, while relations may now be good, with up to 6 million ethnic Albanians living in Turkey, and many Albanians happy to holiday there, historical wounds remain, along with a desire to maintain independence from those that once dominated them.
