For years now, the Western Balkans has operated in the space between European promises and geopolitical realities, opening wide room for the activities of external actors. In such an environment, local elites, slow reforms, and an uncertain European perspective shape the terrain on which the interests of the West, Russia, China, Turkey, and other powers intersect.
About how the region is becoming a periphery of the European order, but also an arena in which global rivalries are reflected through local dynamics, Vuk Vuksanović speaks in an interview for Respublika. Vuksanović is a lecturer in foreign policy and grand strategy at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and an associate at LSE IDEAS, the foreign policy think tank of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He is the author of the book “Serbia’s Balancing Act: Between Russia and the West.”
In the interview, Vuksanović explains why the presence of foreign powers in the Balkans is not merely a consequence of their ambitions, but also of the active role of domestic political elites who use such competition for their own interests. He discusses the limited autonomy of small states, the transformative but also problematic nature of Chinese capital, the myths surrounding hybrid threats, and why the key challenges facing the region are primarily of a domestic rather than global nature. His analyses offer a sober view of where the Balkans stands today and what it will look like in the coming decade.
How geopolitically open is the Western Balkans today to external actors due to the slow pace of EU integration? Would faster progress toward the EU automatically reduce the space for Russian, Chinese, and Turkish influence?
The fact that the EU has been averting its gaze from the region ever since the global financial crisis of 2008 is the main reason why non-Western actors are present in the region. The vacuum exists, and it creates a permissive environment for Russia, Turkey, China, Israel, the UAE, and Azerbaijan, but at the same time, that environment also creates an incentive for the Balkan countries to cooperate with these states in order to compensate for their marginalization by the West, primarily by the EU. An accelerated path to membership would be one of the mechanisms Europe could employ, but given the current state of affairs in the region, as well as in the EU itself and its member states, I am not optimistic.
How do local political elites exploit great-power competition in the region? Is foreign influence more a consequence of the global ambitions of major powers or of regional political calculations?
Both Western and non-Western powers have their own ambitions and interests, and most of those ambitions are global in nature, with the region being only a small part of a larger puzzle. Nevertheless, non-Western actors above all could not be successful in the Balkans without the help of local elites who are willing to cooperate with them. It is popular to describe the Balkan countries either as obedient servants of powers like Russia or as helpless victims of foreign influence. However, local elites enable foreign actors to be present in the Balkans because they see benefit in it. That benefit lies in using these countries to strengthen their negotiating positions vis-à-vis the West, in gaining access to those countries’ resources, or in using their partnerships with these countries to promote themselves before their own populations.
How has the perception of security in the region changed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? Has the Western Balkans become more vulnerable to hybrid threats and political destabilization?
It is very popular, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to say that Russia will open a second front in Europe, but we can see that this has not happened. It suits Russia to have other conflict zones and crisis hotspots in order to ensure that the West has fewer resources and less attention to devote to Ukraine. Still, for that scenario, Russia needs the help of local elites, and local elites are selfish and opportunistic actors who do not want to risk their political survival for Moscow’s sake. Russia occasionally uses Serbia to circumvent Western sanctions, there is opportunistic cooperation between security services, and it suits Moscow to be able to say that there are still countries in Europe that have not imposed sanctions on Russia. Still, that is far from declaring the region a Russian target. The risks the peoples of the Balkans face do not revolve around Russia, but around local problems: weak and captured states, inefficient state administrations, corrupt and authoritarian elites, socio-economic stagnation, and unresolved disputes from the past.
How transformative are Chinese investments and infrastructure projects really for the region? Are the countries of the Western Balkans aware of the long-term political and economic implications of the Chinese presence?
Chinese investments and infrastructure loans play a certain role. They help solve specific infrastructure problems, lift GDP figures, and employ the local population. Yet there is a long-term risk in terms of environmental and labor standards, as well as the problem of corruption. The lack of transparency and the secret agreements that sometimes accompany Chinese capital make China an attractive partner for local elites. These elites are guided by a combination of factors: the fact that EU funds are difficult to access, as well as outright opportunism.
There is often talk of “Chinese money without political conditions.” Is that a myth that suits local governments, or a real advantage China has over the West?
There is some truth to it. Because China shows no interest in influencing the internal politics of the countries in which it operates, this makes it attractive. The question arises whether, in the future, China could change its approach and use its presence in key economic and technological sectors as a pressure point. So far, however, China has managed not only in the Balkans but globally to adapt and correct its mistakes, which is why, particularly in the Trump era, China has managed to present itself as a pragmatic power with which one can reasonably cooperate.
The Western Balkans is often described as a “geopolitical vacuum.” Is that a realistic diagnosis, or an excuse used by local elites to avoid responsibility for their own political decisions?
The vacuum exists. The Balkans is anchored in the Western and European order, but not as an area of full membership; rather, as a periphery and an appendage. In such a condition, centers such as Brussels, Berlin, and Paris show an unwillingness, and very often an inability, to shape developments on the ground, as can be seen in the EU’s reactions to developments in Serbia or in the nearly dead Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. In such conditions, local elites seek opportunities for themselves. Still, they try not to attract open hostility from Western governments, and especially from the United States, which can influence the course of events in ways the EU cannot.
How sovereign is the Western Balkans today, really, in making foreign policy decisions? Can we speak of genuine autonomy, or is it a matter of constant adjustment to pressure from the great powers?
All states, even small ones like the countries of our region, have a certain degree of autonomy, but that autonomy is constrained by the limited capacities those countries possess, as well as by the policies of the great powers. When the great powers show no interest in the Balkans, the Balkan countries act more flexibly, but when they assess that doing so would draw the animosity of a great power, they back down. Just look at how Serbia must weigh its relationships with both Russia and China based on how the United States will react.
Russia, China, and Turkey have different instruments of influence, but where is the region most vulnerable? Is it the institutions, the media, economic dependence, or political elites?
It is difficult to find a one-dimensional answer. It depends on the situation, on which Balkan country is in question, and on which actor. Still, it must be noted that not every form of non-Western influence is the product of some vulnerability that needs to be “patched.” There are also situations where interests simply coincide.
Has the Western Balkans become a testing ground for the hybrid operations of major powers?
Too much emphasis is placed on the notions of hybrid operations, hybrid threats, and hybrid wars. The region is a side arena of the broader rivalry of great and regional powers, used instrumentally as bargaining chips or as a means of gaining influence in Europe.
If we look at the region as a whole, which great power has most successfully exploited the weaknesses of the Western Balkans, and what does that tell us about the region itself?
It is difficult to give a decisive and unambiguous assessment. Western and non-Western powers differ from one another in the degree of power they wield, the degree and nature of their interest in the region, as well as in the instruments they employ. Still, if we look at the current situation, the most accurate description would be that the Balkans is a European periphery left to fend for itself, and that the dominant problems are of a local, not a global, nature.
Looking at the next 10 years, which great power will have the most influence on the Western Balkans, and why? What will be the key factor: the economy, security, political ties, or something else entirely?
Due to structural factors of geography and economics, the region will remain tied to Europe, regardless of the uncertain fate of the EU in such a strategic and political environment. Still, geopolitically and in security terms, for the countries of the region, as for every country in the world, the central question in the 21st century will be how to position themselves in the era of US-China rivalry.
Journalist: Haris Ljevo
