Applying the DISARM framework through an example of FIMI
Foreign information manipulation and interference is a complex process that is realised through several successive phases. One of the most used analytical tools to systematically understand these processes is the DISARM framework, which categorises the activities of malicious actors into four main phases: planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.
The following is a hypothetical example of a foreign manipulative operation aimed at influencing public discourse in a candidate country for membership of the European Union at a time when there is an intensive public debate on reforms related to the process of European integration.
PLANNING
The planning phase is the initial and strategic stage of the operation, during which the basic objectives, desired effects, and target audiences are defined.
1. Defining a strategic goal
Within this stage, the foreign actor determines the desired outcome of the operation. In this particular example, the ultimate goal is to create a social environment in which reforms related to European integration are perceived as illegitimate, imposed by external actors and contrary to national interests.
The ultimate goal is not expressed through a specific political decision but through a long-term change of the public discourse, whereby distrust of institutions and international partners becomes a normal phenomenon in society.
2. Formulation of operational objectives
After defining the strategic goal, the actor sets specific goals that should lead to the desired outcome. In this particular example, they include:
- Increasing negative online discourse related to EU reforms
- Reducing trust in institutions implementing reforms
- Creating a perception that there is a strong “popular resistance” to European integration
These objectives are measured using indicators such as the number of negative narratives, the level of audience engagement, and the dominant tone in public debate.
3. Target Audience Analysis
A key part of the planning phase is the detailed analysis of the target groups. This example identifies:
- Young voters who lack economic security
- Citizens with previously expressed Euroscepticism
- Active social media users who take part in political debates
Such an analysis enables future communication to target groups that are most vulnerable to specific narratives and emotional messages.
The “Planning” phase does not include content creation, but rather establishes the strategic, target, and analytical foundations for the future operation. Recognising these activities, particularly the definition of the final outcome, the formulation of measurable goals, and a detailed analysis of the target audiences, enables early detection of foreign interference, even before the operation enters the preparation and performance phases. Detecting these steps is frequently the result of intelligence activities that are not always possible, so all sensitive topics covered by FIMI operations must be approached with caution.
PREPARATION
During the preparation phase, the predefined strategy is turned into a concrete infrastructure for communication and influence.
1. Microtargeting the audience
Target audiences are divided into several subgroups based on their attitudes towards European integration. For example:
- Citizens disappointed by slow accession process
- Young people do not see the economic benefits of European integration
- Groups that perceive the EU as a threat to national identity.
This segmentation allows for the development of messages and the establishment of communication channels based on the demographic, emotional, and political characteristics of each group.
2. Content development
Based on audience analysis, the actor begins by creating content for use in the execution phase. Following the example, content related to European integration is created, but in various formats designed to reach every layer of the audience:
- Text posts and visuals depicting the EU as an economic unfair partner
- Videos and memes suggesting that reforms are “dictated by Brussels”
- Comments questioning the cultural and identity threat
The content often does not contain direct disinformation but relies on selective presentation of facts and emotional framing to undermine confidence in European integration.
3. Choice of channels and opportunities
In parallel with content development, a strategic selection of platforms and communication channels is made. In this case, the actor carefully chooses platforms with the highest potential for spreading Eurosceptic messages.
- Priority channels include social networks and online media, where debates about European integration are already polarised.
- Algorithmic features favouring controversial content are taken into account, as well as spaces of limited moderation where critical and negative attitudes towards the EU can spread without significant resistance.
- Simultaneously, a presence is planned in the commentary space under official news about the negotiations with the EU, in order to influence “public opinion” and create a perception of false legitimacy.
4. Narrative Development
This step specifies coherent narratives that should survive in the long run. In this specific example, rather than fragmented messages, narratives are developed such as:
- “EU integration means constant concessions without any guarantee of membership.”
- “Reforms are a tool for external control”
- “Elites use the EU agenda for personal gain”
These narratives are flexible enough to adapt to various events, such as opening or blocking chapters, reports from Brussels, or domestic political crises, which allow for long-term usability and consistency, as well as adaptability.
5. Establishment of social assets
The actor establishes social and media means that are thematically associated with Europe and reforms.
- Social media profiles for citizen oversight of EU processes
- Pseudoanalytic blogs of European policy experts
- Websites of “patriotic” communities following the integration
It refers to outlets that are not openly anti-EU, but rather present themselves as critical yet concerned voices, allowing them to reach a larger audience and gain credibility when later disseminating manipulative messages.
6. Building Legitimacy
Official news about European integration is disseminated through established channels, statements by European representatives are cited, and a public debate is encouraged. In this way, these platforms gradually build credibility and create an impression of legitimacy and expertise.
This later enables critical or manipulative interpretations of the same topics to be accepted as credible and “reasonable” positions within public discourse.
The “Preparation” phase represents a crucial but often invisible part of foreign manipulative operations. Through microtargeting, content development, channel selection, shaping narratives and establishing seemingly legitimate social assets, the actor creates a stable infrastructure for future influence. Identifying these activities at this stage allows for early institutional intervention, before the operation enters the active performance and mass impact phases.
EXECUTION
The execution phase represents a moment when the campaign moves from preparation to active manipulation of the information space.
1. Initial test messages
The campaign begins with a limited distribution of content across a small number of profiles or media. These posts most often ask questions or express doubts related to European integration in the specific example:
- Will we accept new terms again without guarantees?
- How much do reforms cost, and what do we gain in return?
Audience reactions are closely monitored, and messages are tailored based on engagement and comments to ensure wider distribution.
2. Content delivery
Following initial testing, mass content placement across multiple channels begins.
- Eurosceptic narratives are marketed through all established channels: online portals, social networks, groups and blogs
- The content is often timed with important political events, such as reports from European institutions or political decisions related to the negotiations
This gives the impression that a negative attitude towards European integration is a direct and logical response to current events.
3. Encourage offline activities
Given that one of the campaign’s goals is to expand beyond the digital space, offline activities are encouraged at this stage:
- Supporters are encouraged to participate in public stands, protests, or gatherings formally related to “defending national interests”
- Some content is recycled into traditional media, such as radio shows, printed columns, or billboards
In this way, the campaign gives the impression of widespread social support and normalises the Eurosceptic position in the public sphere.
4. Survival in the information space
To avoid detection or removal, the actor takes steps to maintain a persistent presence. This includes:
- Profile rotation
- Using multiple platforms
- Regularly changing the format and tone of content
Some of the messages present themselves as legitimate criticism or public debate, allowing them to remain online for an extended period of time while avoiding sanction from platforms or institutions.
5. Maximizing exposure
The aggressive enhancement of visibility is a critical step in the execution phase.
- Eurosceptic content is disseminated in the information space through coordinated sharing, liking, and commenting among the network’s profiles.
- Cross-posting across different platforms gives the impression that the same messages are everywhere, increasing their perceived legitimacy and suppressing the opposing pro-European discourse.
6. Inciting Online Damage
In the final stages, the campaign becomes an offensive online activity aimed at discrediting pro-European actors. Journalists, experts, and public officials who openly support EU integration become targets of coordinated attacks, harassment, and attempts at silencing in the online sphere.
These activities have a dual effect:
- Directly reduce the visibility of opposing views
Indirectly create a “cold effect” in other potential critics, who avoid public expression of pro-European positions.
It is important to note that during the implementation of the “Execution” phase, the Eurosceptic FIMI campaign becomes clearly visible and socially influential. The combination of controlled message dissemination, mass distribution, transition to offline space, long-term survival and active online damage allows the foreign actor not only to amplify eurosceptic discourse but also to systematically suppress the pro-European narrative. Recognising these tactics is key to timely institutional response and protection of the democratic and integration processes.
EVALUATION
The final stage of the operation involves analysing its effectiveness to determine to what extent the malicious actor has achieved the intended effects and how those insights can be used for future manipulative activities.
1. Reach and Engagement Analysis
The actor analyses quantitative indicators such as the following:
- The number of views, shares, comments, and reposts of key messages
- A comparison is made with the situation prior to the campaign to determine whether Eurosceptic narratives are growing or gaining visibility.
Special attention is paid to whether the content is downloaded by genuine users or media, indicating successful penetration into the wider public discourse.
2. Assessment of narrative dominance
It analyses which narratives had the strongest turnout among the different layers of the audience. It is measured which specific expressions related to European integration (for example, “EU without guarantees”, “loss of sovereignty”, and “elites against the people”) were most accepted by the different target audiences.
Low-turnout narratives are identified as ineffective and discarded or redesigned, while successful ones are marked for reuse or further amplification in future operations.
3. Analysis of the institutional reaction
The reaction of opponents and institutions is monitored, that is, whether pro-European actors, institutions, or media have reacted defensively.
- Did they try to deny it?
- Have they ignored the Eurosceptic discourse?
A lack of coordinated institutional response is interpreted as an indicator of the operation’s success, whereas a strong counter-reaction can cause tactical adjustments and corrections in the next cycle.
4. Preparation of the next cycle
The assessment results are used to tailor future strategies and potentially expand the campaign into other political or geographical contexts.
Based on the analysis, the actor decides whether the campaign should:
- Continue at the same intensity
- Redirect to new aspects of European integration (for example, economic chapters or cultural issues).
To be applied in another country with comparable political and social conditions.
The “Assessment” phase serves as a direct link between the completed and subsequent FIMI operations, effectively closing the cycle of the DISARM framework.
