Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) doesn’t defeat you with one lie. It defeats you with a habit. The habit of doubting everything.
At first it seems harmless, a ‘screenshot’, a cropped quote, an ‘explanation’ with a serious tone. And then comes another one. And another one. And nothing has to be completely convincing. It’s enough for it to be repeated and lead you to the conclusion: “There’s no point in me checking this.”
This is exactly where the damage lies, when we start to believe that nothing can be verified. We do not demand evidence and accountability, and instead of asking questions, we become indifferent. Instead of expecting criteria, we assume that “everyone or the majority of people are lying”. In such an environment, it becomes easier for the media and institutions to get away with not providing clear explanations, not correcting, and not being accountable.
This, in fact, is the core of the document “The Media Ecosystem and FIMI in North Macedonia”. If we reduce FIMI to individual posts, we will always react too late and face consequences that we will then race to “extinguish”. But if we understand it as a matter of exposure and structural weaknesses in the media and digital ecosystem, the response can be preventive and systemic, thus reducing vulnerability. This is the crucial difference between ad-hoc reactions under pressure and a policy that protects public debate in the long term.
The European framework as a game-changer
Europe has long understood that manipulation cannot be defeated by individual rebuttals. When the problem is systemic, the response must also be systemic. The focus has therefore shifted from “contentious content” over to trust as a public resource and to the conditions that make manipulation fast, widespread and worthwhile. In this spirit, the European External Action Service treats Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference as coordinated, intentional operations, the aim of which is to undermine public trust in institutions, the media and the very possibility of joint public debate.
That same reasoning is also recognized in the approach of the Council of Europe, which offers a clear, practical formula: resilience is not built with a single measure. Three things must go hand in hand – fact-checking, an advanced design and management of platforms, and stronger user capacities to recognize manipulations, without spreading them further.
The European Union, on the other hand, has entered the “harder” part, changing the way platforms create and amplify risks. Therefore, the Digital Services Act does not reduce the problem to individual posts. It requires the largest platforms and search engines to regularly assess the systemic risks posed by the way they operate and to introduce measures that are reasonable, effective and proportionate. In crisis situations, there is also a special mechanism for a coordinated response at EU level.
This framework does not end with platforms. It is “rounded off” with rules that make political communication more visible and the media system more resilient to pressures and hidden influences. The European Media Freedom Act sets standards for independence and pluralism, in order to narrow the potential for exerting pressure. The Regulation on Political Advertising attacks the highest-risk point – non-transparency, requiring a clear understanding of who is paying, who is targeted with the message and through which channels it is distributed.
On the other hand, the AI Act sets out a framework for the responsible use of systems that can impact fundamental rights and trust. This is particularly important when synthetic or manipulated content, as well as automated decisions, can create serious consequences for the public.
Why our environment remains vulnerable
In our country, vulnerability does not stem from a single source. It is created where the old weaknesses of the media system overlap with the new rules of digital distribution. When some media outlets are barely getting by, it is easier for editorial decisions to succumb to pressures and short-term compromises. In a polarized political landscape, scrutiny often gets sidelined, and the question of “which side the narrative should serve” becomes more important.
In the digital context, this vulnerability is further amplified. Algorithms do not reward accuracy, but reactions. There does not have to be an obvious lie for a frame to become influential. It is enough to repeat it, retell it, and “package” it in new formats, until it begins to sound like “common knowledge.” This normalizes doubts, cynicism, and distrust, the soil in which FIMI most easily takes root.
An additional weakness is the pace. A manipulative message spreads in a matter of minutes, while explanation and correction require time, facts, and credibility. When the media is under pressure to be fast, and institutions react slowly or inconsistently, an asymmetry is created that FIMI systematically exploits.
The key problem, in practice, is the vacuum. When institutions do not react in time, when different bodies send different messages, or when communication is bureaucratic and incomprehensible, a space is created that does not remain empty. It is filled by actors with prepared narratives, channels, and audiences. That is why manipulation “sticks” best precisely during elections and crises, when uncertainty is highest and the need for clarity is greatest.
How to get out of the perpetual playing “catch-up”
The first step is for the state to clearly name the risk. When FIMI is “melded” with concepts such as disinformation, hybrid and cyber threats, responsibility is diffused, and competencies remain unclear. Therefore, FIMI should be embedded in relevant strategies and policies, with a clear division of who is in charge, who monitors, what is measured and how the response is planned. Without such a foundation, each institution will communicate in its own way, and the public will hear different messages from the same system.
The second step is discipline in action. FIMI spreads quickly, often intentionally and it creates confusion, so the response must be rapid, but also verifiable. This requires pre-agreed operational procedures for “information incidents” – who comes up with a position first, within what deadline, based on what data and through which channels. This is not a bureaucratic formality, but a way to prevent a vacuum in which speculation most easily gains the upper hand.
The third step is coordination that really works. A mechanism is needed that will monitor trends, assess risks, and help institutions avoid contradicting each other, especially at sensitive moments. But that mechanism must have clear boundaries – it must not set itself up as a political arbiter of what is “true” and “false” and must not create pressure on the media. If it starts to resemble censorship, trust will be lost immediately, and FIMI thrives exactly where trust is already fragile.
Media independence in the context of FIMI
Wherever FIMI exist, the public service should be a stabilizer, a place on which the public can rely when the information noise is strongest. But this is not achieved by appeals, but by guarantees of independence and integrity provided through transparent and non-partisan elections of management and supervisory bodies, clear rules for editorial responsibility and visible accountability to the public.
The same logic applies to the entire media sector. When ownership and funding are unclear, influences become invisible, so it is expected for the public to grow suspicious. Greater transparency narrows down the “grey zone,” the space in which manipulation is easiest to propagate and hardest to prove, and strengthens the foundation for trust and professional responsibility.
Therefore, the rule that should be adopted as a minimum is simple. The public should be able to easily see who owns the media, where key revenues come from, and what the editorial responsibilities are. When that information is clear and accessible, the space for hidden influences is reduced and public scrutiny is facilitated, a condition without which the media system can hardly be resistant to FIMI.
Resilience is built by both the media and citizens
No strategy will succeed if the public lacks basic habits of checking and navigating the information. Therefore, media and information literacy should be treated as a public policy, not as an occasional project activity. It should be embedded in education as a practical competence, but also extended beyond schools, through adult-learning programs, local initiatives, and work with communities that have the most difficulty in accessing quality information. The same applies to public administration. Poor and inconsistent communication often creates space for speculation and distrust. Therefore, public communication capacities are part of resilience, not an “add-on” to institutional work.
In parallel, there must be conditions in place for public interest journalism to play its role. When speed and superficiality dominate, FIMI gains headway. Investigative journalism and narrative analysis reduce that headway, because they introduce evidence, context and accountability. But support must be transparent, with clear criteria and guarantees that it will not turn into an instrument for rewarding “our own” and punishing “the others”. Otherwise, instead of resistance, another channel for pressure is created.
For a quick overview of key terms, tools and materials for working with FIMI, the Res Publica resource page can serve as a practical reference point.
