In recent years the term foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) has become a fixed part of the vocabulary of the EU, NATO and the security community. The reason is simple: in the 21st century, information is not only a means of informing people, it is also an instrument of power.
Paradoxically, the most successful FIMI operations rarely begin with a wholly invented story. They usually start from a real event, a genuine crisis or an already existing social tension. The manipulation comes later: through careful selection of facts, removal of context, emotionalisation or the planting of false conclusions.
How does a FIMI operation work?
First, a narrative is created or identified. It may relate to security, identity, migration, the economic situation, elections or international relations. The chosen narrative usually attaches itself to something that already worries citizens.
The next step is producing content that will support that narrative: texts, photographs, videos, graphics, memes or supposedly “leaked documents”. At this stage the content does not have to be entirely false. Sometimes it is enough for genuine information to be presented without the crucial context.
Then comes the amplification phase. The same message begins to repeat across different profiles, pages, groups and media outlets. The more often a user sees the same content, the stronger the impression that this is a widely held opinion.
In the next phase, polarisation appears. One part of the public accepts the narrative, another rejects it, and public debate gradually turns into a clash of camps rather than an exchange of arguments.
Finally comes the most important phase: the erosion of trust. At this point it no longer matters whether people believed the specific piece of information. It is enough that they begin to doubt every source of information. This is exactly where the real success of many FIMI operations lies.
The case of the fake Jens Stoltenberg letter
One of the most illustrative examples of this mechanism occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic in the Baltic region.
In April 2020, a letter supposedly signed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was sent to the Lithuanian authorities, to media outlets and to addresses at NATO headquarters in Brussels. It claimed that NATO would withdraw its forces from Lithuania because of the spread of coronavirus among the troops.
The forged letter did not come from NATO, but was part of a coordinated disinformation campaign linked to Russian sources. The aim was to undermine trust in NATO and to create the impression that the Alliance’s eastern flank was vulnerable and abandoned. The Lithuanian authorities and NATO quickly denied the document.
Source: Pexels
From memes to manipulation
When we talk about information operations, many people picture elaborate propaganda campaigns or lengthy analyses. In reality, one of the most powerful weapons today is something far simpler: the meme.
A meme is a short piece of digital content, usually a photograph, illustration, graphic or short video, which conveys a message through humour, irony, sarcasm or a simplified comparison. Its power lies in the fact that it can deliver a complex political or social message in just a few seconds.
This is precisely why memes are so useful in information operations. They are easy to share, quickly understood and usually do not trigger the same level of scepticism as formal media content. Where an analytical article demands several minutes of reading, a meme conveys an emotional message almost instantly.
In the context of FIMI, memes are most often used for:
- mocking institutions or political processes;
- discrediting public figures;
- spreading stereotypes and prejudice;
- oversimplifying complex political questions;
- provoking anger, fear or ridicule;
- normalising a particular narrative through humour.
The problem is not memes themselves. Humour has always been part of public debate. The problem arises when memes become part of a coordinated campaign. In such cases hundreds of profiles can distribute similar visual messages at the same time, creating the impression that a given position is universally accepted or beyond dispute.
Memes are especially effective precisely because they do not even try to change opinion through argument. Instead, they act on emotions and on the way an audience perceives reality. Once an institution, group or policy becomes the object of constant ridicule, trust in it erodes far more easily.
This is why, in today’s information space, analysing memes is not a question of internet culture but a question of media literacy and societal resilience. Sometimes a single image with a few words influences public opinion more than ten pages of reasoned analysis.
A meme works as “information in concentrated form”. Instead of a page of text, one image can convey a message, an emotion and a position in a matter of seconds.
For years memes were regarded as harmless internet entertainment. Today they are recognised as an important tool in modern information operations. As early as 2015 the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence introduced the concept of memetic warfare, stressing that memes can function as a means of influencing the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of an audience.
If the main function of a meme is to make you angry, to frighten you or to ridicule someone rather than to inform you, there is a strong likelihood that it is part of a wider influence campaign.
Personal resilience as the strongest protection
Information operations cannot be prevented entirely, but they can be recognised and their effects can be limited. The strongest protection lies not in technology or in institutions, but in personal resilience: the ability of every citizen to stay calm, informed and resistant to manipulation. Critical thinking is the filter that allows us to separate facts from propaganda, to recognise when content is trying to make us angry or afraid, and to stop emotions from replacing rational judgement.
