Russia has developed an extremely sophisticated disinformation apparatus in recent years aimed at undermining trust in the European Union, NATO, and liberal democratic institutions. One of the key narratives in these campaigns is to portray Germany and other leading EU countries as societies that face deep economic, political, and moral crisis.
This narrative is then targeted in countries that are candidates for EU membership, especially in the Western Balkans, in order to generate Euroscepticism, strengthen pro-Russian political options, and slow down integration processes.
Germany has been one of the main targets of Russian disinformation operations for years. According to Deutsche Welle analysis, Russian campaigns have been particularly intensified ahead of the German elections, with the aim of discrediting the parties of the political center and strengthening radical options. Experts from CeMAS mention that most of the fake news is directed against the Greens, CDU and SPD, while the AfD, a party that advocates a softer approach to Russia, is mentioned almost exclusively in a positive context.
Examples include fabricated stories about the mental breakdown of CDU candidate Friedrich Merz, which have been viewed more than 5.4 million times on the X platform, and false accusations of corruption scandals involving senior officials from the Green party, such as Robert Habeck and Claudia Roth. Such campaigns have a dual function – destabilize the political center in Germany and create a perception that the EU is in deep crisis, unable to cope with internal challenges.
Russia’s information manipulation strategy is based on several key goals: weakening of EU as a geopolitical actor, strengthening of pro-Russian political forces in the EU’s neighborhood, and preventing further NATO expansion. If the EU is portrayed as dysfunctional, divided, and economically unstable, candidate countries lose motivation to reform and align with European standards. In such an environment, pro-Russian parties more easily promote narratives of “alternative partnerships,” “neutrality,” or “balanced politics.”
The Balkans as a training ground for spreading propaganda
The Western Balkans are particularly vulnerable to such narratives due to unresolved ethnic and political tensions, weak institutions, low media literacy, the presence of pro-Russian political and religious structures, and the slow process of EU integration.
At the Sarajevo Security Conference in 2024, experts warned that the Western Balkans is Vladimir Putin’s next front and that the Kremlin is using the region as a training ground for information warfare, including the spread of disinformation and the instrumentalization of ethnic and religious divisions.
Dr. Azeem Ibrahim of the NewLines Institute for Strategy and Policy stressed that Russian influence in the region is “a consequence of the West’s retreat” and that Moscow is skillfully exploiting the vacuum created by the lack of a clear European perspective. Conference director Hikmet Karčić pointed out that the Kremlin has used the Western Balkans for years as a training ground for information operations, including the spread of disinformation and the exploitation of ethnic tensions.
Regional analysts also warn of the growing intensity of Russian operations. Montenegrin analyst Miloš Vukanović of CDT stipulates that “the Russian narrative of a decadent West and a failed Europe is deeply rooted in a part of Montenegrin society, especially through religious structures and media connected to pro-Serbian political actors.” Serbian security expert Zoran Dragišić warns that “Russian influence in Serbia is the strongest in the region precisely because it relies on emotions, identity and historical myths, rather than rational arguments.”
The analysis of the European Security & Defense magazine emphasizes that the Western Balkans became “a key indicator of the changing security order in Europe”, shaped by growing external influence, especially Russian. According to this analysis, the region has become an area of strategic competition, where “age-old lines of discord are reactivated”, and the stability of the Balkans becomes crucial for the wider Euro-Atlantic environment.
Russian disinformation campaigns in the region most often rely on several recognizable narratives. The first is the exaggeration of the economic problems in the EU, especially in Germany. Local pro-Russian portals and social networks often have sensationalist stories about the “collapse of German industry”, alleged mass protests against governments and fabricated social crises. The aim is to create the impression that the EU is not a stable destination and that it “has nothing to offer”.
The second narrative is highlighting the EU’s “double standards” towards the Balkans. This narrative suggests that the EU favors some countries, deliberately slows down the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, N. Macedonia and Kosovo, and “humiliates” the local politicians.
The third narrative is the promotion of Russia as a “protector of traditional values”, especially in Serbia, the Bosnian entity of Republic of Srpska and parts of Montenegro. Russia presents itself as a defender of Orthodoxy, an opponent of the “decadent West” and an ally in the fight against “Western imperialism”.
Profound consequences for the society
When looking specifically at the countries, the narratives become even clearer. In Serbia, the dominant narrative is that the EU is “hostile to Serbian interests”, while Russia is “the only sincere ally”. In Republic of Srpska, the narrative of “failed Europe” is used to justify a political distancing from the EU and a rapprochement with Moscow. In Montenegro, Russian campaigns target divisions between the pro-Western and pro-Serbian blocs, using church structures and media to spread messages of “spiritual endangerment” and “Western decadence”. In N. Macedonia, Russian narratives focus on dissatisfaction with the Prespa Agreement and the claim that the EU has “deceived Macedonians”. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the narratives are fragmented: the story of “EU hypocrisy” is spread among the Bosniak public, while the idea that the EU is “anti-Serbian” and that Russia is the “protector of Serbian interests” is promoted among the Serbian corpus.
The regional Fact Content Lab project provides additional insight into these narratives. It analyzed the most common disinformation about the EU in the Western Balkans and narratives of imposition of LGBTQ values, economic destruction, resource exploitation, and nostalgia for Yugoslavia as “better times” were identified.
The consequences of such campaigns are profound. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, trust in the EU has declined, especially among young people. Disinformation about a “failed Europe” contributes to the feeling that integration is not worth the effort. Parties that advocate neutrality, balancing or have openly pro-Russian positions are gaining popularity. Disinformation deepens the existing ethnic and political divisions, which hinders reforms and slows down progress towards the EU. At the same time, the region is becoming increasingly vulnerable to hybrid threats, including cyberattacks, information manipulation, political infiltration and instrumentalization of religious institutions.
The response to Russian disinformation must be multi-layered: strengthening media literacy, transparency of digital platforms, support for independent media, and more active EU engagement. The slow pace of EU integration creates space for Russian influence, while faster and clearer processes would reduce the region’s vulnerability.
