The European Union has been working for some time on addressing the problem of foreign interference and information manipulation, which does not stop at the borders of the Union’s member states. The countries of the Western Balkans are also part of that landscape. We speak with Stefan Andonovski, Minister of Digital Transformation, about what Macedonia is doing to counter foreign interference and information manipulation.
How vulnerable is Macedonia to foreign interference and information manipulation?
Macedonia is part of a broader geopolitical space in which information is used as a tool of influence — often manipulative, sometimes even malicious. As a small and open democracy, as a NATO member, and as a country with a clear European orientation, we are not immune to foreign interference and information manipulation. Vulnerability should not be viewed solely through the lens of technology. It is connected to trust in institutions, the overall state of the media, the level of media literacy, political polarization, and the ability of institutions to communicate with the public quickly.
I have said before that digital security is not merely a technical issue. It is a question of state resilience. The same applies to the information space. If disinformation erodes public trust, democracy functions with greater difficulty. That is why the approach must be systemic, not ad hoc.
Have Macedonian authorities detected any foreign interference and information manipulation so far?
When speaking about foreign interference, especially when pointing to a state, organization, or specific actor, it must be based on evidence, coordination with the competent security institutions, and, when necessary, with our international partners.
What I can say is that the institutions recognize patterns of hybrid threats, coordinated narratives, cyber activities, and attempts to influence public trust. During the Western Balkans Digital Summit in 2025, we witnessed precisely such a coordinated approach of hybrid activities — attempted cyber-attacks and attempts to influence public trust through the spread of false news about dangers in Macedonian cyberspace.
Then, as now, our task is not to react improvisationally, but to build a methodology. First detection, then analysis, then an institutional and public response.

How should a society build resilience against such attempts at disinformation and manipulation?
The fight against disinformation must not become a fight against criticism. Criticism is healthy for democracy. The problem arises when someone deliberately creates false narratives, uses fake profiles, covertly finances content, or coordinates campaigns with the aim of undermining trust in institutions and democratic processes.
Resilience means that citizens receive accurate information in a timely manner, that the media have the conditions to operate professionally, and that institutions are fast enough and transparent enough so as not to leave a vacuum that manipulations will fill.
Do you have information about attempts to purchase media outlets in Macedonia by foreign companies?
I would not speculate about specific cases unless they have been institutionally verified. Foreign capital, in itself, is not a problem. The problem is non-transparent capital — when we do not know who the ultimate owner is, what their interests are, and whether the media outlet is being purchased as a business or as an instrument of influence.
That is why our focus should be on transparency, not on closing the market. I believe the existing regulation ensures this. If you have transparent ownership, clear rules on financing, and a functioning regulatory system, then the public can assess what interests a given media outlet represents. Without transparency, the risk of covert influence is much greater.
A large number of media outlets in Macedonia are struggling to survive. There are no sustainable revenue streams. Is any form of state support being considered?
In accordance with Article 105 of the Law on Audio and Audiovisual Media Services, funds are allocated from the budget of the Ministry of Digital Transformation for financing broadcasting activities intended for the operation of Macedonian Radio-Television, the Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Media Services, and the Public Enterprise Macedonian Broadcasting.
On the other hand, based on Article 28-a of the Law on Media, financial support is provided for the printing and distribution of print media, in an amount not exceeding 0.03% of the tax revenues realized as established in the last adopted final budget account. On this basis, for 2025, a total of 43,755,172 denars was paid out to 11 media outlets, in accordance with clearly defined criteria established by law.
The broader question is whether any eventual state support buys government influence over the media, or whether transparency, objectivity of criteria, and support for production in the Macedonian language can be guaranteed.

What you described as state aid is quite selective and unfair toward digital media, for example?
This represents an inherited situation, and I can agree that it excludes a portion of media outlets that contribute strongly to media pluralism in the country. From that standpoint, the commitment of the Prime Minister and the entire Government to provide systemic support for all media, journalists, and media workers through intervention in the contributions they pay is well known.
The EU defines a toolkit for preventing foreign interference and information manipulation. Are we applying any of it?
Foreign interference and information manipulation as a new form of hybrid threat in the modern world is actively and continuously monitored both by the competent government institutions and by the civil sector. Media outlets in Macedonia are increasingly becoming targets of manipulation, as well as the transmission of disinformation, which then incites hate speech through social networks.
The new cybersecurity strategy has been adopted, as has the strategy for information and communication technologies, as well as the Law on Network and Information Systems Security, aligned with the European NIS2 directive. Work is also underway on the preparation and adoption of more than 20 secondary legislative acts, the certification of cyber professionals and standards relating to procurement in cybersecurity, as well as the gradual extension of obligations to the private sector, particularly in the areas of energy, telecommunications, banking, and other critical industries. In parallel, the state is also working on protecting the most vulnerable categories — children and young people. The Safer Internet Centre and the National Committee for the Protection of Children on the Internet have been established and are already actively operating.
Those hybrid attacks, disinformation, manipulations… are also part of the domestic scene. What is being done here?
Unfortunately, that is true. There are attempts to deliberately spread lies, disinformation, and manipulation. More precisely, one opposition party is one of the main sources of such conduct. I need not remind anyone of the pompous press conferences held by the opposition SDSM, when for months they spread disinformation to the public about the alleged return of illegal migrants from the United Kingdom and their settlement in Macedonia. As part of this disinformation campaign, the opposition also alleged that the strategic investment agreement between Macedonia and the United Kingdom was directed toward precisely that end, with the well-known slogan “migrants for money.” Such disinformation campaigns are constantly organized on other economic and social topics as well. The damage they cause to citizens’ trust in the system, the role of the journalistic profession, and overall social development is exceptionally high. In that regard, the activities envisioned under the first Media Development Strategy will address these topics as well, where we will discuss them with those who know this subject best — media workers.
In two years there will be regular parliamentary elections — a period “suitable” for foreign interference. What are we doing to prevent such risks?
Risks exist and will continue to exist. A key link in addressing these issues will be the reform of electoral legislation, as well as cooperation between the State Election Commission, the Agency for Audiovisual Media Services, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and our ministry. I hope that with good regulation and strong cooperation we will succeed in preventing some of the threats, and also in building a resilient system that will counter them when they occur.
How prepared are your Ministry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs for a synchronized institutional response to possible foreign interference and for providing assistance to media outlets?
The institutions are working on building and developing mechanisms to deal with these types of challenges. This involves creating trained personnel who will be able in the future to handle such problems, as well as strengthened inter-institutional coordination for the purposes of prevention, early warning, and timely and effective incident response, along with amendments to the existing legal framework, which will be aligned with international practice. In December 2025, the annual conference “Hybrid and Information Threats: From Recognition to a National Systemic Response” was held in Skopje, at which several national models were presented as positive examples of building resilience. The commitment is for the state to build a vision that recognizes threats early, institutions that respond quickly and professionally, and a society and system that are resilient to such threats.
In the course of last month, we launched a major project in cooperation with the United States Government and the University of Štip to define new student programs, qualification profiles, and their training and certification in all areas of cyber protection. This will inevitably encompass fake news, manipulation, and the misuse of artificial intelligence as well.

Will the European Digital Services Act be incorporated into this country, and how? The Ministry of Digital Transformation has the obligation to serve as coordinator for this law.
This year, implementation began of the project “Alignment with the EU Digital and Media Legal Framework and Development of Skills for Digital Transformation,” supported by the EU Office in Skopje. Within Component 1 of the project, an analysis of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act is envisioned, for which a working group has been formed with representatives from the institutions, assisted by domestic and international experts. The Ministry of Digital Transformation is the coordinator of these activities. An analysis of the current situation is underway, which should determine whether we have the capacity, what our options are, what the approach should be, and what role these regulations are to play. At the same time, we need to think about the capacities for implementing this legislation in practice — something that is the subject of active debate in the EU as well.
The same applies to the European Media Freedom Act? How far along is the process? And what does the application of this law mean for Macedonia?
In accordance with the same EU-supported project, activities have commenced within Component 2 aimed at preparing a Strategy for the Development of the Media Sector with an Action Plan and transposing the Media Freedom Act into national legislation. These obligations also arise from the Rule of Law Roadmap. A working group on media policy has been established, which monitors, cooperates, and reports on the implementation of the project. It is composed of representatives from the Ministry of Digital Transformation, the General Secretariat of the Government, the Ministry of Justice, the Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Media Services, the Macedonian Institute for Media, and the Association of Journalists of Macedonia. All stakeholders will additionally be included in the working group, and the participation of domestic and European experts, who are making a significant contribution to the preparation of this important document, is of great assistance.
The Strategy is planned to contain chapters that will provide guidance first on reforms of the legal framework through the transposition of European into Macedonian legislation, reforms and sustainability of the public broadcasting service, the regulatory body, the position of national and regional television stations, national and regional radio stations, print media, online media, social networks, and the role of the self-regulatory body. The strategy will also contain guidance on addressing the challenges of media ownership, media concentration, the protection and safety of journalists and media workers, the social rights of media workers, professional standards of media outlets, their financing, and state and political advertising — all of which must comply with European standards — followed by the monitoring of digital technologies and a range of other issues affecting the media sector as a whole. The working group established to prepare the Strategy will also work on alignment with the Media Freedom Act. The timeframe for the implementation of the project activities is 20 months.
Journalist: Aleksandar Damovski
Photo: Robert Atanasovski
This content was produced by Mkd.mk in cooperation with the Institute of Communication Studies within the project “Tracking, Exposing, and Countering Hidden Foreign Interference and Information Manipulation,” funded by the Government of the United Kingdom, with the support of the British Embassy in Skopje. The opinions and views expressed in this content do not always reflect the opinions and views of the British Government.
