FIMI usually does not rely on a single lie, but on a combination of the posting frequency and timing, the emotion in the content, repetition and masking of the source.
Late one afternoon, in a city in the Balkans, the editorial office receives an “exclusive” link. The text seems alright: a neutral headline, two “quoted” statements, a photo that seems authentic. In the next ten minutes, the same content appears on several other web portals – with almost identical wording. On social media, the posts come in waves, as if on a schedule: first come the distressing questions, then the “testimonials”, then the calls for a reaction and the accusations that “the media are hiding something”.
The young journalist asks a question that every newsroom should ask itself: “Is this just disinformation, or is it something coordinated?”
This example is fictional, but it is also a reality for some journalists, which is why in European practice, such phenomena are increasingly described with the term Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference – FIMI, which represents intentional, coordinated and manipulative activities, often by foreign actors or their proxies, that disrupt the free formation of political will and undermine trust in democratic processes.
Why FIMI is not “just fact checking”
FIMI usually does not rely on a single lie, but on a combination of the posting frequency and timing, the emotion in the content, repetition and masking of the source. The goal is often not to make you believe a specific fallacy, but to create three effects:
to create panic, to deepen polarization and to reduce confidence that “something can be verified”.
That is why, in the new policy paper of the Institute of Communication Studies (ICS) “The Media Ecosystem and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference“, FIMI is treated as a broad risk that encompasses both content and behaviour: coordinated inauthentic activities, hacking and “leaking”, fabricated profiles, organized amplification, and the like.
The matrix that brings order: four categories of channels
One practical framework that helps newsrooms think in a structured way is the FIMI Exposure Matrix and the visual depiction of an “iceberg”: the visible part is just the tip, and the most important infrastructure and coordination are below the surface.
Following that logic, in order to more easily recognize and handle the channels that carry the manipulation adequately, they are grouped into four categories:
Official state channels – Official profiles and websites of institutions, their representatives and official voices that set the tone and often “legitimize” the story for the other layers.
State-controlled outlets – Media that is funded, managed or editorially controlled by the state, with a public and recognizable connection such as public service broadcasters or public information agencies.
State-linked channels – Formally independent media, web portals or networks that operate under the supervision or with the support of state or party-affiliated actors, but do not announce this. Technical indicators (domain data, ownership structure, (non)transparent financing, synchronized publishing, text templates, etc.) often help to identify them.
State-aligned channels – Sources that cannot formally be connected to a state entity, but show systematic alignment and similar behavioural characteristics, thereby playing a significant role in FIMI activities.
This instrument can be especially useful for journalists and editors to help them decide whether to publish something that looks like normal news, but may actually be part of a coordinated strategy to spread disinformation.
Balkan vulnerability: where the system tends to “crack”
In North Macedonia (and the region), FIMI is easily effected due to real weaknesses: a small market, economic vulnerability of the media, political polarization and high dependence on platforms. The ICS analysis correctly points out that measures against FIMI are not just “anti-disinformation”, but also a matter of institutional responsibilities and platforms, especially within the framework of European regulations.
From the perspective of newsrooms, gaps often become visible precisely when a “suspicious wave” hits, because at that moment they enter a mode of quick decision-making, without enough time and prearranged routines in terms of who performs the checks, who goes to the field, who verifies videos/photos, who archives evidence and how to communicate with the public when institutions are mum. Haste reduces verification and increases the chance of amplifying manipulative content. And when journalists do provide verification and context, they are often the target of organized online attacks.
In its global survey on online violence against women journalists, UNESCO points out that online hate is often “interwoven” with disinformation. Some of the respondents stated that they have been targets in attacks related to orchestrated disinformation campaigns, and a significant number also reported self-censorship and negative consequences on mental health, which directly reduces editorial resilience and increases the cost of professional work.
What to do: disciplined, yet uncensored defence
The most dangerous mistake is to respond to FIMI with a reflex to establish control. This is where Europe makes a difference: the goal is integrity of information and transparency, not a “ministry of truth.”
In practice, this means a few simple, but powerful moves.
The editorial team should have a “basic protocol” for FIMI that is activated when there are signs of coordination: synchronized posts, new profiles, identical phrases, “exclusives” without verifiable sources. This protocol does not have to be long, but it must be known.
An additional important aspect is to introduce the practice of collecting evidence during attacks on digital media channels by archiving links, time-stamped screenshots, and saving originals. This is both journalistic practice and protection for journalists when attacks turn into threats.
At a systemic level, it is important to take advantage of the European regulatory momentum. The Digital Services Act (DSA) introduces obligations for very large platforms around systemic risks, transparency and harm reduction measures, and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) sets a framework for media freedom and safeguards. In parallel, the Code of Conduct/Practice against Disinformation remains an important instrument for transparency and accountability, especially in relation to platforms.
In practice, FIMI wins when it forces us to run at someone else’s pace and react on reflex, instead of professionally. Therefore, the defence should be the opposite – routines, editorial discipline and transparency: to clearly state what we know and what we are still checking.
One thing is clear, and that is that FIMI will not disappear. It will evolve, use new formats and exploit every rift in society. Still, newsrooms are not helpless. If we treat FIMI as a risk to be managed – with a matrix, protocol and transparency, instead of as “news to be rebutted”, then the chances for manipulators become significantly smaller.
