These activities abuse democratic mechanisms to exert influence through legitimate institutions and individuals, creating narratives in favour of the source from which they come. Often, the effects are not immediately visible, but are long-term and geopolitically and economically significant.
In recent years, “hybrid threat” is probably one of the most frequently used, but also the least understood terms. This is largely due to the fact that hybrid threats encompass an exceptionally wide range of activities, united by their subversive nature and long-term effects on national security and the international order. As a result of the diversified and subtle forms of action, there is no consensus on the definition, but in essence, the term hybrid threat refers to a different type of activities that are orchestrated by a single power centre. They are always strategically planned and coordinated under the cover of state and/or non-state actors by the same centre, as a tactic for exerting influence in order to effectuate change or cause damage to the existing order.
A “victim” can be any individual or institution with decision-making power at the local, regional, national or institutional level. These actions are deliberately targeted at any sphere that is vulnerable or represents a potential field for the abuse of civil rights and freedoms.
Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference – the new era of influence
Hybrid threats are gaining new momentum with Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). These are deliberate actions by state or non-state actors to influence public opinion, political processes, or social norms in another country.
The development of technology and the expansion of cyberspace have broadened the potential of FIMI to unimaginable proportions. Why? We are increasingly dependent on technology, which results in greater exposure of privacy and personal data online. Our clicks and online habits leave a digital footprint that reveals more about our personality and preferences than we probably know about ourselves. Algorithms created based on our behaviour place content on us that “inflates” our information bubble, creating a parallel reality. In addition, personal data theft and trading has become a powerful weapon for microtargeting and manipulation of attitudes. Have you ever wondered why a certain piece of information has bombarded your social media, while your neighbour may not have even heard of it?
The shift from traditional to digital media offers great benefits, but also poses serious risks. Professional journalism is often drowned out in the infodemic, fighting for survival and the truth. Digital media, just as democracy, are often weaponised. An example of this is the sudden rise of unregistered websites just before elections, and the OSCE report on the recent elections in North Macedonia notes that (election) campaigning on social media is not regulated.
Abuse of electoral processes and democratic mechanisms
Electoral interference is on the rise, all over the world, in different ways, with different effects, at different stages of the campaign. Disinformation and fake profiles are also used outside of election cycles to cause social polarization and impose narratives that would add support for a particular party. Voters vote according to their own convictions, but the extent to which they were able to form their own position independently and based on facts depends on the availability of arguments that were known to them or placed before them.
There have been several cases of hacking and leaking of private emails in the US and French elections. In the case of the US elections, such activities ousted Hillary Clinton from the campaign and brought Donald Trump to the throne in 2016. Other blatant attempts at interference and influence are the abuse of civil association and activism, i.e. the financing and support of current political parties and the overnight formation of new ones, as well as civil and humanitarian organizations and the like. By abusing such forms of association, attempts are often made to discredit or silence the real ones, or to reduce the power of all actors who have the capacity to make a difference. The elections in Moldova this year took place in a broader regional atmosphere of anxiety caused by the trend of electoral destabilization throughout Europe. In Romania, the 2024 presidential elections were annulled due to allegations of Russian interference – an episode that culminated in a failed coup led by a previously unknown candidate fuelled by foreign funding and targeted populist messaging.
These activities abuse democratic mechanisms to exert influence through legitimate institutions and individuals, creating narratives in favour of the source from which they come. Often, the effects are not immediately visible, but are long-term and geopolitically and economically significant. The goal is to enable and facilitate the rise to power of partners who are “suitable for negotiation” and more susceptible to influence. That is why a Freedom House report says that digital platforms are the new battlefields of democracy.
Reactions to national legislation
After the director of MI5 categorized election interference as a threat to national security, the United Kingdom passed new legislation.
The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme is an initiative designed to improve transparency and protect national security by monitoring foreign influence activities. As of 1 July 2025, all individuals or organisations involved in activities directed by foreign powers must register. Within the UK’s foreign interference framework, “foreign power” is broadly defined in the National Security Act 2023 and includes a head of state, a foreign government or its agencies, a foreign local authority or a ruling political party. It can also include individuals, such as employees of a foreign government or individual members of a ruling party, when they are acting in an official capacity or holding a position of authority. Failure to register is a criminal offence. Certain activities are exempt from registration, such as those carried out by recognised news publishers, legal professionals, diplomats and members of their families. This is intended to increase transparency and deter covert foreign influence.
But in transitional democracies or autocratic regimes, such practices can be abused to stifle the already narrowed space for any form of opposition, which was the source of long-lasting protests in Georgia. No matter how transparent the practices of control are, the abuse of democratic mechanisms by malicious power centres can narrow the liberal perimeter.
Is there a way out of the “vicious cycle”?
Hybrid threats and foreign influence often use the openness of liberal systems – freedom of expression, pluralism and democracy – as a tool to undermine those same values. This is the paradox of modern security: what makes a system strong can be abused to make it vulnerable. And only informed and critically aware citizens can build resilient institutions.
