In recent days, the Croatian public space has seen a debate that at first glance may seem like another in a series of political conflicts between the government and the opposition. However, Prime Minister Andrej Plenković’s proposal to procedurally “link” the election of the President of the Supreme Court to the election of three judges of the Constitutional Court has raised much more profound questions: independence of the judiciary, the limits of political power, where does a legitimate political compromise end and dangerous institutional trade begins.
“There will be linked appointments, which means that we will go into the process of electing the President of the Supreme Court only if we elect constitutional judges according to the principle that two of them are chosen by the parliamentary majority and one by the opposition”, recently said Prime Minister Andrej Plenković.
The election of the President of the Supreme Court, which position has been vacant since April 2025, was turned by the Prime Minister and HDZ President Andrej Plenković into a means of political conditioning with the demand that the process of electing the President of the Supreme Court can proceed only if the judges of the Constitutional Court are elected in accordance with a political ratio of 2:1. Namely, the Constitutional Court currently has 10 judges, instead of 13, of which five are elected at the proposal of the parliamentary majority and five at the proposal of the opposition. Adding two judges nominated by the ruling HDZ and one from the opposition would change the existing balance, creating a majority that would be politically closer to the current government.
Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s idea of so-called “linked appointments” implies that the election of the President of the Supreme Court is not decided independently, but exclusively in a package with the appointment of three judges of the Constitutional Court. Such an approach, according to the Prime Minister, should ensure political consensus and unblock the institutions.
However, the almost unanimous reaction of judges, constitutional law experts and part of the public points to a fundamental problem: the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court do not have the same constitutional role, nor do they belong to the same branch of government. While the Supreme Court is part of the judiciary, the Constitutional Court is a special constitutional body that stands outside the classical separation of powers and is tasked with overseeing the constitutionality of the actions of the legislative and executive branches. Therefore, public debates quickly highlighted that this is not a technical issue, but a political conditioning that can lead to institutional blockage.
Connecting these two processes is by no means seen as a neutral solution, but as a potential encroachment on the fundamental principle of separation of powers, political pressure and a form of conditionality that has no basis in the Constitution.
In this context, the idea of ”package-decision-making” looks more like a political trade than a responsible institutional compromise. The key question is not whether the Parliament can reach an agreement politically, but whether it can do so in a way that relativizes constitutional procedures and changes their purpose.
The voice of judges and the profession: a rare consensus against the political precedent
One of the most striking elements of this debate is the strong and unusually public reaction from judges and constitutional law experts. The Croatian Association of Judges has clearly stated that there is neither a constitutional nor legal basis for linking the election of the President of the Supreme Court with the election of judges of the Constitutional Court.
The judges warned that such an approach creates a dangerous precedent in which politics not only influences the judiciary, but openly conditions its work, and also trades with institutions that should be independent. Similar messages also came from individual Supreme Court judges, who have publicly expressed such ideas as unacceptable and expressed hope that they would not be implemented in practice.
Constitutional experts further emphasized that the procedural connection of two different constitutional jurisdictions is not allowed and cannot be justified by political pragma. Prominent constitutional expert Sanja Barić warned that this dilutes Parliament’s responsibility and opens up space for decision-making based on political quotas and not on the expertise and integrity of the candidates.
The fact that such reactions do not come from political circles but from outside the party framework, from the judiciary itself, gives them additional weight and credibility.
Such “package-decision-making”, experts point out, dilutes the responsibility of representatives and makes it impossible to have a quality discussion about each candidate individually. Instead of selecting the best candidate for a specific position, decisions are made based on political compromise rather than expertise and integrity.
Political dimension: power struggle or struggle for control
The opposition described the government’s proposal as an attack on democracy and an attempt to politically seize control of the judiciary, while some actors warned of “political trade”, “dirty political kitchen” and a dangerous precedent which can weaken institutions in the long run.
The President of the Republic of Croatia, Zoran Milanović, also joined the discussion, and clearly stated that the election of judges must not be the subject of political trade, that tying these processes is a violation of the Constitution and the law, and that such practices belittle and undermine the constitutional order and the independence of the judiciary.
Although political conflicts are normal in democracies, the problem arises when institutions that should remain outside of daily politics are drawn into them. This is precisely the core of the concern in this case.
One of the arguments justifying the idea of linked appointments is the need to unblock institutions. However, the question arises: is the institutional blockage a problem to be solved by compromise or a means of pressure?
If the logic that key judicial functions can be conditioned by political agreements is accepted, it opens up space for future blackmail and trade. Today it is the courts, tomorrow it could be some other independent body.
This case is particularly relevant for countries in the region that have undergone or are still undergoing processes of democratic consolidation. The issue of political influence on the judiciary is one of the key issues in the reports of the European Commission, the Venice Commission and other international bodies.
The Croatian example shows that even membership in the European Union does not in itself guarantee the resilience of institutions. Democracy is not a state, but a process that requires constant vigilance, especially when it comes to the courts.
An important element of this story is the role of the media, which followed the reactions of judges, experts and politicians in detail. Thanks to such reporting, the public gained an insight into the complexity of the problem and the potential consequences of the proposed solutions.
The responsibility, however, does not lie only with the media. An active and informed public is essential for preserving democratic standards. Discussions on constitutional issues must not remain reserved only for lawyers and politicians.
A boundary that should not be crossed
The case of linked appointments in Croatia clearly shows how thin the line is between political compromise and the erosion of judicial independence. When the judiciary begins to be viewed as an object of political exchange or part of a negotiating package, citizens’ trust in the democratic order is seriously threatened.
Regardless of the outcome of this particular situation, the debate that has opened has long-term value because it is not about who will profit politically in the short term, but about what precedent is set for the future. Normalizing political trade around the courts means accepting the logic according to which the independence of the judiciary is conditional and changeable. The independence of the judiciary in a democratic society must not be relativized by political calculations, but it is rather an unquestionable foundation of any real democracy.
This case is not just a Croatian story. It serves as a warning that democracy is not eroded by sudden moves, but by gradually pushing the boundaries of what is considered permissible. The line at which the judiciary becomes a political currency is one that no democratic society should allow itself to cross.
