FIMI is becoming a recognizable problem in modern democracies, and also in North Macedonia. We talked with Italian expert Federico Giulio Sicurella about what we need to do at our country to build mechanisms to deal with it. Sicurella, who was recently in Skopje at a conference on this topic at the Institute for Communication Studies, says that there is no universal recipe or model to copy, but there are valuable approaches for inspiration. He also said that the fight against FIMI requires constant vigilance and that a „whole of society“ approach is needed, but he also pointed out that completely declaring FIMI illegal is neither feasible nor desirable.
How would you define Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), and how does it differ from general disinformation?
While most people have some general understanding of what constitutes disinformation, FIMI might escape an easy grasp, as it operates in the shadowy intersection between information warfare and domestic political discourse.
The common element between disinformation and FIMI is the intent to mislead audiences by manipulating information. However, they differ in three key respects: origins, focus, and objectives.
In terms of origins, FIMI refers exclusively to foreign or foreign-linked actors. Domestic spreaders are relevant only if they form part of a foreign-directed ecosystem. In this sense, FIMI is narrower than disinformation.
In terms of focus, FIMI prioritises behaviour over content. It matters less whether information is verifiably true or false, and more whether actors operate in a coordinated and inauthentic way. In this respect, FIMI is broader than disinformation.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a difference of objectives. Disinformation may serve a range of purposes, including commercial profit. FIMI, on the other hand, deliberately aims to interfere with political processes, notably elections, and to erode public trust in institutions. This is why we speak of FIMI as a direct and severe threat to democracy and security.
FIMI is a serious threat
In North Macedonia, there is still no mechanism that will monitor trends, assess risks and help institutions deal with FIMI. What would you recommend to the authorities, what steps should they take to improve that segment?
-The first and most important step is to come to a shared understanding and recognition of FIMI as a serious threat to democratic decision-making.
Democracy thrives only when the information environment allows diverse and conflicting views to emerge organically and coexist openly. When foreign actors are able to manipulate the information environment by planting narratives that serve their interests or by suppressing unfavourable voices, democracy is at risk.
Having such a shared understanding is the precondition for the next step: building institutional preparedness.
By disabling an informed public discourse, FIMI threatens the political system itself – and systemic threats require systemic solutions. This means moving away from ad hoc responses driven by crisis situations and dictated by contingency, towards proactive, institutionalised frameworks that prioritise long-term resilience, cross-sector collaboration, and the continuous monitoring of information ecosystems.
This is precisely what the European Union, a global leader in the fight against FIMI, has done over the past decade.
How this can be achieved in practice in North Macedonia is a matter of political deliberation and contextual sensitivity – there is no universal recipe or a model that can simply be copy-pasted. Yet, there are valuable approaches that authorities can look up to for inspiration. Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency, France’s VIGINUM, and Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation are widely regarded as leading examples. The EU itself may serve as an effective knowledge transmission belt for sharing best practices across member states and candidate countries.
But then again, institutional set-ups and operational protocols are only as good as the political will backing them. Without consensus on the FIMI threat, defence mechanisms risk becoming ineffective or, worse, being co-opted for partisan political gain.
Which foreign actors have been most active in the Western Balkans regarding information manipulation?
The short answer is Russia, China and, to a lesser extent, Iran. These state actors are known to engage in influence operations targeting contexts of strategic interest – evidence of this is robust and unequivocal – and the Western Balkans are no exception.
Russia has repeatedly tried to influence political processes in countries that are critical to its expansive geopolitical ambitions, seeking to destabilise their democratic institutions and prevent their integration into Western structures like the EU and NATO. In the Western Balkans, Russia can leverage sympathetic political elites, deep cultural ties, and an established media presence.
China’s strategy, on the other hand, centres on cultivating a reputation as a dependable economic and cultural partner, also for the Western Balkans. This is frequently achieved by silencing dissent and promoting a curated narrative of unity and stability.
This being said, let me raise an important caveat. We must not limit ourselves to the ‘usual suspects’. Illiberal and autocratic tendencies also exist within the Western Balkans, where ruling elites may deploy FIMI to try to influence political processes in neighbouring countries.
Western nations are not immune to democratic backsliding either, and old allies could evolve into new threat actors. In particular, current developments in the United States deserve close scrutiny, given its major influence on the global information ecosystem.
In today’s volatile geopolitical landscape, combating FIMI demands constant vigilance regarding the democratic credentials of all actors involved.
Non-state actors should also be included in the dialogue
Is a strong response possible from weak institutions and where should we start to raise the overall readiness of institutions in North Macedonia to deal with FIMI?
I believe institutions grow stronger when they own and commit to their goals, rather than when they are forced to meet external demands. To raise North Macedomia’s institutional readiness to address FIMI, I would therefore engage stakeholders who already recognise FIMI as a critical societal, political, and security challenge, fostering a focused dialogue with them.
Specifically, I am thinking of policymakers who already grasp the far-reaching implications of information operations, researchers and practitioners familiar with FIMI’s technical and procedural dimensions, and community actors who possess first-hand knowledge of the social conditions where manipulation takes root and the audiences it targets.
It is crucial, in my opinion, that this dialogue include non-state actors from the start.
In expert circles, this is referred to as a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to combating FIMI. It means that effective resilience cannot be built by government alone; it requires the active collaboration of civil society, academia, the private sector, and the media to detect threats, amplify credible narratives, and foster the critical thinking necessary to inoculate the public against manipulation.
Which institutions of North Macedonia should step forward in preventing FIMI operations?
-Ideally all of them. Since FIMI cuts across all societal sectors and leaves no target out of reach, prevention must be a collective, cross-institutional effort.
More realistically, a short-term priority would be establishing structured cooperation between relevant ministries – defence, interior, and foreign affairs – and state agencies tasked to deal with crisis situations.
Creating dedicated FIMI task forces in every body is possible, but a more strategic path is to envisage a central coordination hub. Such a hub would collect evidence from across the government and empower institutions to design and execute effective counter-measures.
This was the core mission of a project I was privileged to support, led by the Institute of Communication Studies and funded by the UK Embassy in Skopje.
But this represents just the first milestone. The long-term horizon is one where these nascent practices mature into deep-seated institutional and societal resilience against information threats. One where ‘policing’ the information environment becomes a last-resort intervention rather than a permanent, reactive state of emergency, allowing society to function with inherent immunity and critical autonomy.
How can North Macedonia upgrade its legislation to be able to deal with FIMI operations?
-Let me begin with a crucial caveat: making FIMI illegal altogether is neither feasible nor desirable. It is no coincidence that the most widely accepted definition of FIMI, put forth by the European External Action Service (EEAS), describes it as a “mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviour.”
The line between malicious disinformation and robust political debate is often subjective. Defining FIMI with the precision required for criminal law without infringing on freedom of expression is a legal minefield; conflating harmful foreign interference with protected speech could empower authoritarian regimes to silence legitimate dissent. Moreover, criminalisation would drive these activities underground, making them even harder to monitor.
While legislation is no silver bullet, well-designed norms and regulations are nonetheless indispensable for mitigating the harms of information manipulation.
The most urgent area for intervention, in my view, is platform accountability. FIMI operations travel rapidly across platforms, exploiting algorithmic amplification. Yet, social media platforms have little incentive to mitigate these risks, as their business models prioritise engagement over information integrity and user safety. Here, enforceable rules can make a decisive difference.
The most advanced model in this regard is probably the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA). It has already demonstrated success in compelling very large online platforms to proactively assess and mitigate systemic risks, including FIMI, while mandating greater transparency in algorithmic decision-making and advertising.
North Macedonia should consider aligning its regulatory framework with these standards.
The power of confusion
Can FIMI influence public opinion on key geopolitical issues such as NATO or EU integration?
-Yes, but not through the direct, linear persuasion we often assume. Evidence suggests that FIMI operations rarely rely on a single, unified message. Instead, they saturate the information space with attention-grabbing narratives that are often discrepant or even mutually contradictory.
Why would a hostile actor do this? The answer lies in the power of confusion. Threat actors have long realised that sowing chaos is more effective than persuasion. When the public is bombarded with contradictory messages on divisive topics, it triggers cognitive overload, forcing disengagement and eroding trust in the information ecosystem itself.
It is at this point that FIMI can really do significant damage. When the information environment is highly fragmented and the public disoriented and disengaged, it becomes easier for malign actors – and their domestic proxies – to hijack the narrative, push polarising agendas, and manipulate political outcomes without facing a coherent or informed public resistance.
While the ancient maxim was divide et impera (‘divide and rule’), the hallmark of contemporary FIMI is confunde et impera (‘confuse and rule’).
How might emerging technologies like AI-generated content (deepfakes, synthetic media) amplify FIMI threats?
-The answer lies in scale and speed. Generative AI acts as a force multiplier, allowing hostile actors to fabricate synthetic media content, amplify manipulative messages, and saturate information spaces at an unprecedented pace.
With the advent of agentic AI, campaigns can now be fully automated – from identifying vulnerable audiences to dynamically adapting narratives in real-time. This transforms FIMI from a static flood of content into a responsive, intelligent adversary capable of exploiting societal fractures with surgical precision, overwhelming human moderators and fact-checkers who simply cannot keep pace.
However, AI is also a vital tool for defence against FIMI. Applications are potentially vast, ranging from risk analysis and threat assessment to designing and deploying defensive measures and responses. Organisations may also leverage AI to enhance digital literacy, capacity building, and societal resilience.
This creates an AI-vs-AI confrontation with two critical challenges.
The first is vulnerability. AI defence systems themselves become targets. Malicious actors may employ ‘data poisoning,’ prompt injection, or model tampering to corrupt detection tools and skew their output.
The second challenge is the ethical risks involved. In such high-stakes environments, AI applications must adhere to strict ethical safeguards. We must balance the competitive advantage of AI against the risk of incompatibility with democratic values, ensuring these tools enhance security without causing harm or enabling unethical surveillance.
This content was produced by the The Institute of Communication Studies (ICS).
Journalist: Sonja Kramarska
Photographs: Tomislav Georgiev
