In April 2025, China’s Ambassador to Albania, Pang Chunxue, gave an interview to a local media platform in which she called for more cooperation between the two countries, including in the area of investment. Tapping into Albanian nationalism by referencing the “valiant Illyrians and the tenacious national hero Skanderbeg,” she described Albania as a long-term, “bosom friend” that even distance cannot change.
Unlike other countries in the region, Albania has a long history with China, dating back to its communist era, which lasted almost fifty years. In 1949, the two countries started diplomatic relations, and in 1954, they exchanged ambassadors. The same year, China began providing economic assistance to Albania, and several high-level visits were made. As Albania pursued stronger relations with the Soviet Union, China remained, bubbling away in the background.
Initially, Albania was a staunch Soviet ally post-World War II, relying on Moscow for economic and military support. However, by the late 1950s, Hoxha grew wary of Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization policies and perceived “revisionism,” which clashed with Albania’s hardline Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Soviet-Albanian split culminated in the severing of diplomatic ties in 1961, followed by Albania’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact in 1968.
This rupture pushed Hoxha toward China, which was also distancing itself from the Soviet Union due to ideological disputes. From the early 1960s, China became Albania’s primary ally, offering substantial aid — over $2 billion in loans and grants by the 1970s — while filling the void left by the Soviets.
Chinese assistance included industrial projects, military equipment, and technical advisors, enabling Albania to pursue rapid industrialization. In return, Albania supported China’s anti-Soviet stance and promoted the Chinese worldview, also speaking on behalf of Beijing at the United Nations and throughout Eastern Europe.
However, the Albania-China alliance was not a seamless replacement for Soviet ties. While the USSR had provided comprehensive support, including infrastructure and political backing in the communist bloc, China’s aid was more limited, constrained by its own economic challenges and geographic distance.
Albania’s isolation deepened as it lacked the broader Soviet network. By the mid-1970s, as China pursued détente with the West, Hoxha grew increasingly disillusioned, viewing China’s reforms under Deng Xiaoping as a betrayal of socialism.
The 1978 break with China left Albania without major allies, forcing Hoxha to double down on self-reliance, a stark contrast to the earlier Soviet-dependent era. This oscillation from Soviet to Chinese alignment, and ultimately to isolation, significantly contributed to the continued economic decline of Albania and the further starvation of its people. These laid the foundations for the ultimate dissent that would take place just over a decade later.
Fast forward to 2025, and the Chinese ambassador mentioned that approximately 6,000 experts were sent to Albania during the communist era, along with the creation of 140 projects, some of which “still function today.” She continued by explaining that the countries have signed an agreement on mutual visa exemption, tourism cooperation, and consultations on the entry of honey and dairy products into China.
In addition, China, she said, is Albania’s third-largest trading partner, with annual exports of approximately $500 million. She also mentioned pushing forward the “Belt and Road Initiative,” a name that has not been heard in a while.
In 2013, the Leader of the Communist Party of China, and the country’s President, Xi Jinping, announced his new plan to the world. He spoke of a China-led “Silk Road Economic Belt” based on the principle of the old trade route that connected east to west centuries ago. Promising a “win-win” situation for all those involved, and stating that China would never interfere in the internal affairs of the countries involved, interest was minimal and non-committal.
In six years, the country signed up 150 countries and 29 international organizations. But unpicking exactly what the project entails is not particularly easy. Railways, airports, highways, bridges, and tunnels—all funded by money from Beijing—have sprung up across numerous countries, but it is almost impossible to find a comprehensive list of BRI projects. Information on contracts, costs, and loans is not readily available, and even the government’s “Belt and Road Portal” appears to be designed to confuse.
Source: freepik.com
Investment in and from the initiative peaked in 2016 and 2017, before gradually decreasing and reaching an all-time low in 2023, while China continued to increase its spending. Some organizations have estimated that the Belt and Road Initiative could increase global GDP by $7.1 trillion annually, but others argue that it should come with a warning.
Debt Trap Diplomacy
China’s debt trap diplomacy involves extending large-scale loans to developing nations for infrastructure under initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), fostering financial dependency to secure geopolitical leverage. Globally, this strategy is evident in cases like Sri Lanka, where the inability to repay a $1.4 billion loan for the Hambantota Port led to a 99-year lease to China.
Similarly, in Africa, countries like Zambia face debt distress from Chinese-funded projects, which grant Beijing influence over resources and policy. These loans often feature opaque terms, high interest rates, and prioritize Chinese contractors, limiting local economic benefits.
In the Western Balkans, China targets Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Montenegro’s Bar-Boljare highway, funded by a $944 million loan from China’s Eximbank, once accounted for 25% of GDP.
The country’s inability to manage the loan payments led to fears that, under the terms of the contract, some of the country could be seized by China. However, in 2021, the country sought assistance from the EU, and a deal was brokered among four Western banks. It subsequently left the agreement, attempted to go it alone, and then entered into a new hedging deal in 2024, with a total of seven payments made as of April 2025.
It has extended the hedging deal to the end of 2028, seven years before the loan is due to mature. The stretch of road on which the initial loan was taken out to construct is still not completed.
Meanwhile, Serbia has also received significant loans from China, accounting for nearly 10% of its total foreign debt. Investments include projects such as highways, railways, and thermal power plants, as well as sewer systems and wastewater treatment facilities. The total debt is estimated at around EUR 4 billion, more than what the EU has invested.
Even North Macedonia has found itself under the weight of massive Chinese loans, used for projects such as the Kozjak hydroelectric power plant, the Milandinovci-Shtip highway, and the one connecting Kircovo and Ohrid. Money owed to Beijing accounts for approximately 8.7% of all foreign debt and 3% of the country’s GDP.
How Did Albania Resist?
In Albania, however, the Chinese have failed to get a foothold. There are no publicly available figures on Chinese debt, with the figure likely to be zero.
While early enthusiasm suggested a potential for significant Chinese investment, political caution, alignment with Western allies, and local challenges have constrained the implementation of large-scale BRI projects. One notable instance of Chinese involvement was the 2016 acquisition of Tirana International Airport’s concession rights by China Everbright, a Hong Kong-based firm, in partnership with Friedmann Pacific Asset Management.
However, in 2020, Albanian-owned Kastrati Group purchased 100% of the share capital from the Chinese company for EUR 71 million, five years before the previous concession was due to expire.
In the energy sector, Geo-Jade Petroleum, a Shanghai-based company, acquired controlling rights to the Patos-Marinza and Kucova oil fields, which are Europe’s largest onshore oil reserves, producing approximately 13,000 barrels daily. China attempted to win several other projects, including the Arberi Road project, the Blue Corridor Motorway, and several hydropower proposals, but lost them to Albanian companies or the US.
As for media, an area where China has had considerable success influencing other countries and promoting its agenda abroad, in Albania, efforts and impact are limited. While Beijing has spent a fortune on upgrading the image of state-owned CGTN, Xinhua News Agency, and CRI, and some offer coverage in the Albanian language, their scope is limited.
A 2020 study found that more than 1,000 China-related articles were published over five years, with almost half portraying it in a positive light.
At one point, Albania also strengthened its ties with Huawei, including through an educational program called “One Thousand Dreams.” The programme pledged to train 1000 IT talents, donate books to universities, and give toys to children’s hospitals. While the project was scheduled to run for five years, little has been heard of it since 2019. Then, in 2020, the then-US Ambassador to Albania, Yuri Kim, announced Albania had joined the US State Department initiative, “The Clean Network.”
This included a pledge not to use any 5G services from Chinese vendors, including Huawei. It came amid a European crackdown on the use of Huawei systems, amid fears that they would feed back information to China or compromise sensitive systems. Today, Huawei maintains an office in the centre of Tirana. Still, there has been no talk of it providing 5G or any telecoms systems to public institutions or the public in Albania.
But why has Albania kept China at arm’s length, appearing to take one step forward and two steps back when it comes to collaboration? Albania’s strong alliance with the United States and its aspirations for EU membership have made it cautious about deep Chinese involvement. For instance, US investments in projects like the Skavica hydropower plant and EU-funded port upgrades align with Albania’s NATO membership (since 2009) and EU candidate status, offering strategic and financial incentives that overshadow BRI’s debt-heavy model.
Concerns about China’s “debt-trap diplomacy,” highlighted by cases like Montenegro’s highway debt, further deter Albania from large-scale BRI commitments.
Unlike Serbia, which embraced BRI projects like the Belgrade-Budapest railway, Albania’s smaller market and Western alignment limit its role in China’s regional strategy. Without policy shifts or an improved investment climate, Albania is likely to remain a peripheral BRI player, favoring more minor, less risky Chinese engagements while deepening its Western ties.
The only leverage China has over Albania is that it is the country’s third-largest trading partner. Still, so far, Tirana shows no signs of being willing to become Beijing’s economic hub in the region. Every attempt China has made to take over crucial infrastructure in Albania has been met by political roadblocks or passed to a local or US competitor.
That said, Albanian public opinion does not seem to position China as a threat. Albania’s security barometer in 2024 found that over 74% of Albanians did not perceive China as a threat to the country’s security, while Iran and Russia were seen as the most significant threats.
While there is no doubt that China has a strategy for strengthening ties with Tirana, and the ambassador’s interview is just a part of that, the reality on the ground is unlikely to change. While it may smile and make lip service with politicians and diplomats, there is no appetite for reliance or stronger ties with Beijing. China sells better in Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, while Albania remains firmly looking to the West, and the EU and NATO.
