Thanks to one event, the pre-election period in Hungary resonated far more strongly than is usually the case when elections are held in a country. That event was the discovery of explosives in a gas pipeline in Serbia. More specifically, it involved the discovery of highly destructive explosives near the gas infrastructure connecting Serbia and Hungary. The way this intriguing story unfolded can serve as a textbook example of foreign information manipulation and interference, or FIMI, a relatively new phenomenon that has become more visible amid the geopolitical shifts shaking the world today.
The drama, reported by both Macedonian and foreign media, unfolded roughly as follows.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated that Serbian authorities had uncovered a “sabotage operation” in Vojvodina and linked it to Ukraine, which, according to him, had “worked for years to cut Europe off from Russian energy.” He said the incident represented a “direct threat to Hungary.” Shortly afterward, Belgrade’s Military Security Agency, the counterintelligence body, stated that it was “not true that Ukrainians had attempted to organize” the alleged plot. Orbán’s main opponent and Hungary’s new prime minister, Péter Magyar, then claimed that Orbán was carrying out a false-flag operation with the help of Serbian and Russian actors, due to declining support for his Fidesz party. Meanwhile, the spokesperson of Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied any responsibility and criticized attempts to “falsely link Ukraine” to the case, adding that the alleged plot was most likely a Russian operation ahead of the Hungarian elections.
This Russia-Ukraine-Hungary triangle, through its blame game, created confusion across the entire region. But not among experts trained to recognize so-called FIMI operations. For them, the matter was clear from the very beginning. That is why the “directors” of this drama saw great potential and extended it into a second act.
The second act took place after the Hungarian elections and was launched by the new political star, Péter Magyar, following his electoral victory. He announced that his government would thoroughly investigate whether the entire case had been used for political influence ahead of the vote in Hungary.
Magyar went a step further, alluding to Russian influence in the region. He stated that he knew exactly what connected Orbán, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, and that he “roughly knew who the godfather” behind those relationships was. In European diplomatic circles, this was immediately interpreted as a direct allusion to Vladimir Putin.
The reaction from Belgrade was swift and sharp. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić publicly called on Magyar to present his evidence. “Come on, say who is behind it,” Vučić replied, arguing that the new Hungarian leader was merely speculating and had no idea what he was talking about. The Serbian president announced that the investigation would be completed transparently and that its findings would prove that Magyar was relying on rumors rather than facts.
Divisions ripe for exploitation
Macedonia is geographically far from Vojvodina, where the explosives were found near the Balkan section of TurkStream. Politically, however, it witnessed a practical example of a cross-cutting FIMI operation that appeared designed to further convince Serbia that Ukraine is the enemy and Russia the friend, to help Orbán preserve his throne through the narrative that he was pursuing the right policy by blocking European aid to Ukraine, and to emphasize the Russian umbrella over Serbia and the wider region.
We will see how this drama ends. In the meantime, however, it would not be a bad idea for our country to draw one lesson from it: warfare is not conducted only with weapons, but also through information and disinformation, with the aim of manipulating public opinion.
It is no secret that ethnic tensions and skepticism toward European integration are vulnerable to exploitation in this country. FIMI campaigns use the social, political and cultural divisions in North Macedonia as weapons, with the aim of delegitimizing public institutions and further polarizing society. As the Metamorphosis analysis of FIMI operations in the country also notes, our state can be seen as an example of how weaknesses in the democratic, media and social systems can be exploited for both foreign and domestic information manipulation and interference. The wide availability of fast internet, combined with a mismatch in the population’s level of digital literacy, also creates fertile ground for manipulation.
The domestic trend of information manipulation is also highly important. As several experts emphasized at the recent international conference organized by the Institute of Communication Studies, without DIMI, domestic information manipulation and interference, there can be no FIMI, foreign information manipulation and interference. In other words, foreign interference merely builds on domestic interference and manipulation.
However, as in many other areas, the state is making slow institutional progress in this field. While randomly reading one study, I came across a striking finding: at least five parliamentary committees have a mandate to cover issues related to FIMI, yet only the Committee on Defence and Security is making even a slight attempt to scratch the surface of the iceberg of chaos in this area. This shows that there is neither a coordinated national response nor political will in the country to move things toward waking up the institutions, which, incidentally, are the first targets of such harmful influences.
Macedonia remains far from regulation
Why is an institutional response important in this area?
First, because the state’s ability to build resilience against information manipulation will not only shape its democratic future, but also serve as an example for the region in recognizing modern methods of harmful foreign interference and in developing the capacity to respond to them. Second, it is necessary in order to protect electoral processes in circumstances where key OSCE recommendations have still not been implemented, including those related to preventing the misuse of state resources during elections, pressure on voters, campaign finance transparency, and other issues. These weaknesses reduce trust in the authorities and leave space for both domestic and foreign actors to exploit public disappointment. Third, there are interethnic relations and Macedonian-Albanian government coalitions, which institutionalize clientelism. And fourth, there is the excessively long path toward EU membership, which erodes citizens’ trust in the Union as well as in domestic leaderships and their sincerity, or lack thereof, in placing the country firmly on the European track.
The lectures by foreign experts that we had the opportunity to hear at the aforementioned conference confirm that our country is currently in what could be called an ad hoc era in this field. This means that the response to disinformation is reactive rather than proactive, forced by a crisis after it has emerged, and partial, because there is no unified concept or coordination.
Who is standing in whose way?
The example of the narrative that came from Bulgaria last July speaks precisely to Macedonia’s lack of preparedness to deal with sophisticated manipulation wrapped in diplomatic reactions. After the head of the Macedonian Government, Hristijan Mickoski, was described by prominent Bulgarian figures as the “North Macedonian” prime minister, official Skopje attempted to point out the mistake, since under the Prespa Agreement the adjective “North Macedonian” is not used. The correct formulation is “Prime Minister of North Macedonia.”
This was met with hostility in Sofia. The accusations were that the authorities here were deliberately showing a lack of respect toward Bulgaria, although in reality the opposite was the case. The Bulgarian ambassador in Skopje also claimed that sharp, manipulative and often offensive statements were being made here by senior government officials, aimed at Bulgaria and the EU. The Bulgarian side said it was especially unacceptable to call a country that systematically provides real and selfless assistance an “enemy state.”
In this case, Macedonia was portrayed before both the domestic and international public as a country hostile toward Bulgaria, even though in reality Bulgaria is the country blocking Macedonia’s European path and the one that set conditions for the leadership in Skopje to meet its demands in order for EU membership negotiations to continue. Regardless of the fact that these demands have been packaged as European and are part of the negotiating framework, it is widely known what role Sofia played in this process. From this, it seems, comes Bulgaria’s continued need to sensitize the Macedonian and European public by trying to turn the story around, as though Macedonia were standing in Bulgaria’s way, and not the other way around.
The country’s aspiration for EU membership has also recently exposed it to malign influences and disinformation manipulation centered on whether the EU will survive as an organization, with emphasis on claims that it is on the verge of collapse and that Macedonia should abandon its intention to join the bloc. Similar narratives also claim that there will be no further enlargement and that aspiring countries should change course and seek new partners, preferably China and Russia.
Macedonia seems to close its eyes to such phenomena, trusting that its citizens will not fall for malicious manipulation. The question is even whether the state has the capacity to recognize such operations. The fear of being accused of threatening freedom of speech or media freedom is sometimes the main obstacle to building such capacity, especially in countries that fall into the category of young democracies, as ours does. But many more advanced countries are already debating these issues with concern and building procedures for responding to such operations. As a starting point, it would be desirable for us to establish mechanisms for monitoring and risk assessment.
