Radicalization of Youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Online Amplifiers of Extremism and Ethno-National Polarization

Dino Cviko

Politics

Tales from the Region

13.05.26

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Young people consume problematic content on the go, while scrolling and without the necessary awareness that this can act as an amplifier in the radicalization process – followed by algorithms that literally bombard them with similar content.

Two concerts by the controversial Croatian musician Marko Perković Thompson, held in the middle of February 2026 in the Bosnian town of Široki Brijeg, featured Ustasha chants and fascist salutes.

This caused numerous controversies and reactions from the general public, and it is particularly worrying that the concerts were attended by a large number of young people, many of whom shouted Ustasha chants and raised their right hands in a salute associated with fascist iconography.

Instead of a clear distancing, the whole story was given additional legitimacy in the public space by Dragan Čović, the leader of HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the most influential political figure among Croatian politicians in Bosnia and Herzeogina, who hosted this controversial singer and called him a friend. In addition, the concert was attended by a Judge of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Marin Vukoja, considered close to the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Extreme as “content”

Events in Široki Brijeg were condemned, among others, by the Delegation of the European Union to BiH, the UN and the OSCE, and also charges were pressed against those responsible at the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the videos have long been on social networks and are available to everyone – especially young people.

The videos have appeared on Instagram, TikTok, Facebook… all of them platforms where this kind of content is easily accessible. Young people consume it casually and by scrolling, without necessarily realizing that it can act as an amplifier in the radicalization process, and algorithms then literally bombard them with similar content.

In 2024, Euronews reported about the findings of the “ISD” think tank that identified a network of around 200 pro-Nazi TikTok accounts that publish content promoting Nazi ideology. These accounts reportedly reach tens of millions of views and push narratives such as Holocaust denial, glorification of Hitler, and the idea of ​​“Nazism as a solution” to contemporary problems. Various anti-immigration and racist content, footage of terrorist and other attacks, and footage of violence also appear on the networks.

radikalizacijata na mladite vo bih featured
Source: Envato

This is especially dangerous in a society like Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is deeply divided and in which ethno-national polarization and political rhetoric have become mainstream discourse.

A research of the Sarajevo Media Center showed that the majority of young people do not have the basic media literacy, nor the basic knowledge and skills needed to participate in public communication and to be able to recognize, protect themselves and react to problematic content. With their habits of using media and online content, they mostly remain within one-sided understanding of the world, in accordance with dominant ethno-national policies.

The same analysis emphasizes that online media platforms and social networks are generally not used for direct recruitment for extremist activities, but are key venues for the spread of ethno-national hatred and extremist ideology.

Detector reported on one such thing: a TikTok live was identified showing Serbian volunteers joining the Russian army in the invasion of Ukraine. Thus, a social network was misused as a channel for promoting warfare and, in this particular case, a megaphone for pro-Russian propaganda and fighters in the ranks of the Russian army.

The growing popularity of Telegram

If social networks are a “showcase” in which this kind of content is quickly spread and normalized, Telegram is the place where they get an interpretation and an audience, then repackaged into political messages and consolidated through closed groups. Such channels are popular among young people.

Detector wrote already in 2024 how pro-Russian Telegram channels in the Balkans are an increasingly popular training ground for recruitment and disinformation, and that more than half a million people follow 23 prominent pro-Russian Telegram channels in Serbian and Russian languages – all dedicated to the Balkans – where citizens are urged to donate military equipment for the invasion of Ukraine and promote military units made up of citizens of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The journalists of this investigative magazine succeeded in infiltrating into a private Telegram channel used to recruit fighters for the Russian army in Ukraine and to get in touch with people who recruit young people from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In doing so, they proved that such recruitment exists and is taking place.

They also wrote how pro-Russian Telegram channels are synchronously spreading panic and predicting conflict in BiH. That not everything is in the online world only is proven by the recent ruling in a court in Moldova, which ruled against three citizens of that country, and which confirmed the existence of Russian training camps in Bosnia and Serbia.

From the channel to the field

Telegram channels are very popular among (ultra)right-wing movements, but they are not the only form of organization. In recent years, groups have emerged that were modeled after foreign extremist organizations, presenting themselves as humanitarian initiatives – protecting children, animals or “helping the community” – but their posts, symbolism and messages often point to the promotion of extremist narratives.

Among them is the infamous pro-Russian motorcycle club Night Wolves, who, according to media reports, was receiving money from institutions from the Bosnian entity of Republika Srpska, and they also appeared at public events. There are also organizations like Panther, Srbske Chasti, Samoposhtovanja… They often have good connections with center-right political parties and even with the authorities.

Such organizations, promoting patriarchalism, often use misogyny, anti-feminism, homophobia, and even racism to recruit new supporters.

In that milieu, one can also identify certain organized fan groups that operate throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some are influenced by external narratives – the fans of Borac from Banja Luka support the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and that was also expressed at the stadium, Zrinjski fans from Mostar publicly emphasized symbols used by the Ukrainian battalion “Azov”, which has been a role-model for the far-rightists around the world for years…

When it comes to the radicalization of young people, fan groups in particular contribute to the spread of interethnic tensions. Along with national and religious insults, chants are often heard hat glorify war criminals or deny and even celebrate genocide and other crimes, including slogans that allude to weapons and mass crimes – messages that cannot be interpreted otherwise than as normalization of threats. Fans from neighboring countries have also clashed in Bosnia and Herzegovina – recently there was a conflict between fan groups of football clubs Hajduk (Croatia) and Crvena Zvezda (Serbia), which happened near the International Airport in Tuzla, where 23 mostly young people were injured, and 93 were detained by the police.

When hatred turns into violence

The promotion of homophobia online has also had consequences on the ground. In March 2023, LGBTIQ activists and journalists were attacked in Banja Luka, and some politicians relativized or justified the incident, further fueling the atmosphere in which violence became “permissible”.

A similar pattern is seen on the eve of every Bosnian Pride parade in Sarajevo, when threats and hate speech are seen on social networks. Although no incidents were recorded – primarily due to strong security measures – it is interesting to note that the Ministry of Interior of the Sarajevo Canton has determined that a significant number of those writing offensive comments, or comments that could be considered a threat to the security, live outside Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The radicalization of youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, fueled by online extremist boosters and external campaigns, is further deepening the polarization of society. Without political accountability, serious media literacy skills and critical thinking, including clear response from institutions and regulators, these campaigns will continue to find fertile ground, and the consequences will be ever greater.

Dino Cviko

Dino Cviko is a journalist from Sarajevo with experience working at Al Jazeera Balkans, the online magazine Žurnal, the Pratimo tendere portal, and Federal Television. He is the co-author of the documentary films “Brotherhood” and “Party Armies”, and the author of the film “Fight for Life: The System Against Oncology Patients”, for which he received the regional CEI SEEMO Award in 2024 for outstanding achievements in investigative journalism in the category of young professional journalists.