North Macedonia is going through a particularly sensitive period: Euro-Atlantic integration, frequent electoral processes, complex regional and global security challenges. In such contexts, foreign influence campaigns very rarely come “waving a flag and signed at the bottom”. They seep through the cracks in our system: distrust, inconsistency, an underdeveloped culture of transparency.
When new conspiratorial “news” emerges, a good part of the public sees it first on social media, not in official announcements. By the time institutions react, usually the narrative has already been “processed”: shared, commented on, framed in several more theories about the “true background” of the events. This is not just a problem of North Macedonia, but part of broader trends of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), i.e. external organized efforts to influence our attitudes, elections and political decisions.
What is specific to North Macedonia is that awareness of the risks exists, but the response remains fragmented. That is the main message of the policy paper titled “Institutional Response to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference in North Macedonia”, prepared by the Institute of Communication Studies. Instead of an integrated system, we have a mosaic of well-intentioned, but often isolated initiatives.
What exactly is FIMI and why is it a problem of the system, not just of the content?
When we say foreign information manipulation and interference, we do not mean every lie on the internet. This is a phenomenon that implies coordinated, often long-term efforts by foreign actors (state or non-state) to influence public discourse by combining several techniques:
- creating or amplifying disinformation;
- using networks of fake or coordinated accounts;
- targeting sensitive topics (identity, ethnicity, gender issues, Euro-Atlantic integration);
- combining information attacks with other hybrid instruments (cyber-attacks, economic pressures, diplomatic “framing”).
This type of influence cannot be solved by simply deleting individual posts or sanctioning individual media outlets. A systematic response is needed, with a “birds-eye view” of the risks, bringing together the puzzle pieces from different institutions, and reacting in a timely and coherent manner.
What does a “fragmented system” look like in practice?
The background research for the policy paper showed that in North Macedonia there are numerous institutions that, each in their own domain, have points of contact with FIMI: security services, regulators, bodies, ministries, public relations services. All of them, in some way, “catch” part of the problem. But:
- there is no centralized place where information on suspected cases is collected and jointly analysed;
- reactions are most often ad hoc and dependent on the initiative of individual actors;
- strategies and action plans exist on paper, but are not sufficiently operationalized through clear roles, protocols and indicators;
- The Security and Intelligence Community Coordination Council is not fully performing the function it has been assigned;
- The human resources, tools and budgets of institutions for monitoring, analysis and strategic communication are limited.
All of this is compounded by low levels of trust in institutions and strong political polarization. When institutional communication is delayed, unclear, or inconsistent, manipulative narratives are easier to “stick” onto existing doubts and frustrations.
An integrated system does not mean new censorship, but clearer coordination
It is easy to turn the discussion about FIMI into a fear of censorship. However, what the document proposes is something else: a national coordination and resilience mechanism, which would provide:
- clearly defined roles (who does what, when and how);
- decided protocols for information exchange between institutions;
- systematic monitoring of risks and threats;
- harmonized and transparent communication with the public.
It is not a “ministry of truth”, but a way for the state to stop reacting in a partial and delayed manner. Instead of seeing separate attempts at “debunking” or “exposing” that are not connected, an integrated system would enable timely, coherent and credible explanations supported by facts and modern communication tools.
Why do we need this now and not “when we have time”?
North Macedonia is going through a particularly sensitive period: Euro-Atlantic integration, frequent electoral processes, complex regional and global security challenges. In such contexts, foreign influence campaigns very rarely come “waving a flag and signed at the bottom”. They seep through the cracks in our system: distrust, inconsistency, an underdeveloped culture of transparency.
The FIMI Integrated Response System is not another bureaucratic construct, but an investment in:
- better protection of democratic processes, especially elections;
- protection of the public media space from organized, foreign influence;
- increasing the resilience of institutions, media and citizens to manipulative narratives;
- restoring trust in institutional communication, through timely, clear and consistent messages.
The next step: from document to decision
The policy paper does not claim to be the “last word” on this topic. It is an attempt, based on research, interviews and comparative practices, to offer a clear framework for discussion: what kind of system we need, which models are realistic, what are the risks of keeping the status quo.
The next step is not a new piece of paper, but a political and institutional decision:
- to choose a model;
- to set clear deadlines;
- to ensure resources, transparency and accountability.
Until that happens, we will continue to live in a situation in which foreign information manipulation develops rapidly and in a coordinated manner, while our response remains slow and fragmented.
