An integrated national response mechanism for FIMI is not a luxury, but a prerequisite for protecting elections, public discourse, and trust in institutions at a time when information threats are becoming increasingly sophisticated. The question is not whether we will pay a price, but whether we will pay it upfront, with a smartly designed system, or successively, through crises, polarization, and lost trust.
Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) is not just “another online topic”, but a systematic security challenge. The analysis showed that North Macedonia has the pieces of the puzzle (strategies, institutions, individual initiatives, etc.), but there is no clear mechanism that connects them into a functional system for countering hybrid and information threats. The question now is not whether we need an integrated response, but how to get to it. The policy paper titled “Institutional Response to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference in North Macedonia” proposes three realistic institutional models, based on comparable experiences and the local context.
This blog focuses on exactly that: what the options are, what each option provides, and what the minimum steps are to turn words on paper into everyday practice.
Three models, three different pathways
The document offers three options for an institutional solution for a national response to FIMI:
- Standalone National Resilience Centre
This option implies the establishment of a new public institution with a clear mandate for FIMI and related hybrid threats.
What are the practical implications?
- centralized risk analysis, narratives and campaigns;
- designated team for strategic communication and support of institutions in a crisis context;
- clearly visible public identity: citizens know “who is in charge” when it comes to such issues;
- a stable budget and the opportunity to develop expertise in the long term.
Drawback? It requires more time, resources, and political will to form a new institution: legal solution, staffing, new infrastructure. This would be a strong solution, albeit not the fastest one.
- National coordination mechanism under the Government (“core + network”)
The second option envisages a small “core” within the Government or the General Secretariat, which coordinates a network of focal points in key institutions.
The key features are:
- a small, but visible coordination office with political significance/weight;
- regular meetings, situational briefings and joint decisions;
- easier start: it can be established by a government decision, without creating a new legal entity;
- it uses the existing institutional architecture, without a large administrative “footprint”.
This is the most realistic option for a quick start, especially in an environment with limited resources. The risk is not to overload the “core” and not to make the system dependent on one or two key individuals.
- Strengthened Security and Intelligence Community Coordination Council
The third option is the least “visible” to the public, but the easiest to implement: using the existing Security and Intelligence Community Coordination Council, with an expanded mandate in the domain of FIMI.
This means:
- better use of existing security coordination channels;
- rapid operationalization through new standards and procedures;
- lower institutional cost: not a whole new institution, but clearer rules.
The drawback is that without a strong focus on transparent communication and public presence, there is a risk that FIMI will remain a “closed topic” in the security system, rather than an issue of democratic and societal resilience.
There is no “perfect model”, it is important to establish a rhythm and routines
Which option is the best? The document is straightforward: there is no perfect solution. The choice depends on:
- the political will to build a new institution or strengthen existing ones;
- the available resources (staff, budget, tools);
- the level of established trust between institutions;
- the need for a clear public identity of the mechanism.
But there is something more important than form: rhythm. Even the best model “on paper” will remain peripheral if it lacks:
- a stable calendar of meetings and briefings;
- a clear routine for reporting, assessment and response;
- a network of focal points that really work, not just exist in a decision or rulebook;
- a system that learns: through indicators, lessons learned, and course correction.
Therefore, the paper proposes a roadmap that applies to all three options. Instead of waiting for an ideal solution, it proposes a minimal, yet practical set of steps that can be taken in the next 12–18 months.
Roadmap: six key steps for a national system
Regardless of the model chosen, the paper suggests several core steps that make the difference between “we have a strategy” and “we have a functional system”:
- Clear ownership and formal mandate. The first question is simple: who is in charge? Without an explicitly defined lead institution, be it a centre, a coordination office, or a strengthened council, all other recommendations remain “nobody’s business”. The mandate should briefly describe the goals, objectives, and relationship with other institutions.
- Network of focal points inside the institutions. Each relevant institution (security services, regulators, ministries, PR departments) should nominate a focal point and a deputy. Their role mustn’t be just formal, but should be briefly described: what they monitor, when they signal, to whom and how they pass on information, and how often they report.
- A calendar of routines, not just ad-hoc meetings. An integrated system is not built by “meeting when there is a crisis.” It requires:
- monthly technical meetings with a short situational brief;
- quarterly meetings at a higher level, where guidelines are issued, implementation is monitored and corrective measures are determined;
- a brief record after each meeting: what was decided, who is responsible and by what deadline.
This gives the system rhythm and institutional memory, rather than being dependent on individual enthusiasm.
- A simple, but binding procedure “report – assessment – response”. Instead of complex procedures, it is important to have one clear document that answers the questions:
- what types of cases are reported (suspicious narratives, coordinated campaigns, hybrid incidents);
- who receives the report and the deadline for the initial assessment;
- the decision-making method to see whether a case will go through the standard procedure or move to a higher alert level;
- who communicates the decision and measures to the public.
This procedure can also be presented as a simple “flowchart” that all focal points know and use.
- Capacities: training, tools, and staff that knows what they are doing. Institutions cannot respond in a coordinated manner to FIMI if people on the inside lack basic knowledge of digital campaigns, narrative analysis, media literacy, and crisis communication.
Therefore, the document recommends:
- a catalogue of training courses at three levels: basic for all focal points, advanced for analysts and communicators, and specialized for elections or crisis situations;
- a clear goal for each training and a specific output (tool, protocol, template);
- official confirmations of completed trainings, to maintain institutional memory and for staff rotation.
- Standardized information exchange and minimum measurability. In order not to waste time and not create “institutional noise”, the following is necessary:
- each incident should be registered with a minimal, but standard set of fields (date, source, short description, impact assessment, measures taken, status);
- that there be a shared, controlled repository where these records are stored and updated;
- monitoring a small set of indicators: regularity of meetings, number of trained focal points, time from signal to first coordinated response, reach and understandability of messages.
A complex indicator framework is not necessary, a “minimum package” will suffice, showing whether the system is moving in the right direction and where there are blockages.
From decision to implementation
The major risk for any resilience policy is it getting “trapped” in analyses and documents. This is why the policy paper insists on a roadmap, not just a description of models.
The next steps would be:
- to choose an institutional model (or a combined phase: quick start with a coordination mechanism, further evolution towards an independent centre);
- to give a formal mandate and deadlines for establishing the minimum infrastructure;
- to determine resources, i.e. staff, tools and budget, in accordance with the chosen model;
- to establish a regular mechanism for accountability to the Government, the Parliament and the public.
Until that happens, North Macedonia will continue to face foreign influence campaigns with a slow, fragmented, and often uncoordinated response.
An integrated national response mechanism for FIMI is not a luxury, but a prerequisite for protecting elections, public discourse, and trust in institutions at a time when information threats are becoming increasingly sophisticated. The question is not whether we will pay a price, but whether we will pay it upfront, with a smartly designed system, or successively, through crises, polarization, and lost trust.
This blog does not offer a simple recipe, rather it is an invitation to a concrete decision: which model of national mechanism will we choose and when will we finally start building it?
